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Recent Cases
GARNISHMENT-JURISDICTION OVER THE RES AND
THE SHERIFF'S RETURN
Fidkerson v. Laird'
On November 6, 1963, the plaintiff, J. A. Fulkerson, received a default judg-
ment against the Lairds on a promissory note. A general execution was issued on
December 27, 1963, returnable on January 20, 1964. The execution was returned
ndlga bona and a summons to garnishee directed to W. E. Foster was issued and
was returned by the sheriff as follows:
And, on the 27th day of March, 1964 summoned W. E. Foster, as
Garnishee, copy of the summons being attached hereto and made a part
of this return, all in Shannon County, Missouri. 2
Foster did not answer the summons or interrogatories exhibited to him. Sub-
sequently, the circuit court entered an interlocutory order on September 3, 1964,
directing Foster to pay the judgment amount into court. Foster failed to pay said
amount into court and plaintiff Fulkerson filed a "Motion for Judgment Against
Garnishee." Thereupon Foster filed a "Motion to Quash Execution, Summons to
Garnishee and Service of Sheriff's Return Thereto." The circuit court sustained
the plaintiff's motion and overruled Foster's. In the Springfield Court of Appeals,
the judgment against Foster was reversed on the ground that the sheriff's return
was insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the res since it reflected no constructive
seizure or declaration of garnishment as required by Rule 85.21. This decision by
the court of appeals is the subject of this note.
It has been a long stated rule in Missouri and elsewhere that strict compliance
with statutory requirements is a prerequisite to support the court's jurisdiction
1. 421 S.W.2d 523 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
2. Fulkerson v. Laird, supra note 1, at 525.
3. The court relied on alternative grounds, not brought out by counsel, that
could alone have been case dispositive. Rule 76.04 Mo. R. Civ. P. (Sec. 513.040,
RSMo 1959) provides that "[elvery execution issued from any court of record shall
be made returnable in not less than 30 days, nor more than 90 days, at the option
of the judgment creditor, from the date of issuance." January 20, 1964, was only
twenty-four days after the date of issuance and was "in plain violation of the
mandate." Fulkerson v. Laird, 421 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
Rule 90.02 (Sec. 525.020, RSMo 1959) was also violated. It requires specifically
that "[tihe return date of the summons to garnishee shall be the return date of the
execution." Because the execution was returnable January 20, 1964, all subsequent
proceedings, i.e., those on March 27, 1964, were null and void. Fulkerson v.
Laird, supra, at 527.
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over garnishment proceedings. 4 The explanation of this proposition lies primarily
in the notion that, because the process was unknown at common law, "every step
of the proceeding must find clear sanction in the statutory law."5 There is also
a tendency to note that since garnishment involves a pursuit of property in the
hands of third persons, the enactments should be interpreted in favor of those
against whom they are invoked so as to not unnecessarily disturb the status quo.8
But in Missouri, strict compliance with statutory requirements is made
difficult by garnishment statutes and rules7 that have been judicially described as
"a confusing hodge-podge. ' 's Although Missouri makes no provision for a separate
writ of garnishment,0 chapter 525 RSMo 1959 and Rule 90(A) of the Missouri Rules
of Civil Procedure are entitled "Garnisitments," and would ostensibly set forth the
procedure for notice and summons. Rule 90.0210 says that in the case of garnishment
in aid of execution, the service of garnishment and the subsequent proceedings
against and in behalf of the garnishee "shall be the same as in the case of garnish-
ment under an attachment" and shall have "like effect as in the case of an
original attachment."" A reasonable interpretation of this requirement would be
that garnishment in aid of execution was intended to follow the same proceedings
that are set forth in Rule 90 for garnishment in aid of attachment This would
mean that Rule 90.0512 would apply to writs of execution as well as writs of
attachment.'" More than ninety years ago, however, the Missouri courts interpreted
the statutory ancestor of Rule 90.0214 to require reference beyond the "Garnish-
7nent" chapter and to relate to the statutes under the title "Attachments."'15 The
4. Epstein v. Salorgne, 6 Mo. App. 352, 354 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878); Federal
Truck Co. v. Mayer, 216 Mo. App. 443, 450, 270 S.W. 407, 409 (St. L. Ct. App.
1925); State ex rel. Shaw State Bank v. Pfeffle, 220 Mo. App. 676, 685, 293
S.W. 512, 516 (St. L. Ct. App. 1927); Rallo Contracting Co. v. Blong, 313 S.W.2d
734, 737 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958). See 6 AM. JuR. 2d Attachment and Garnishment§ 7 (1963).
5. Blackburn Motor Co. v. Benjamin Motor Co., 340 S.W.2d 155, 160 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1960).
6. Blackburn Motor Co. v. Benjamin Motor Co., supra note 5; Trinidad
Asphalt Mfg. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 214 Mo. App. 115, 258 S.W. 64, 67 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1924).
7. The Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure relating to execution, attachment,
and garnishment have corresponding sections in the Revised'Statutes of Missouri.
The rules supercede the statutes. Mo. R. Civ. P. 41.04.
8. Chenowith v. LaMaster, 342 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961).
9. Mo. R. Civ. P. 90.01. Milliken v. Armour & Co., 231 Mo. App. 662, 664,
104 S.W.2d 1027, 1028 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937).
10. Substantially the same as Sec. 525.020, RSMo 1959.
11. Mo. R. Civ. P. 90.02.
12. Same as Sec. 525.060, RSMo 1959.
13. "The officer serving a writ of attachment shall return all bonds taken by
him into court, with the writ, and a statement of the names of all garnishees,
together with the day and hour and the places when and where they even respectively
summoned." Mo. R. Civ. P. 90.05.
14. Wag. Stat. 664 Sec. 2.
15. Keane v. Bartholow, Lewis & Co., 4 Mo. App. 507, 509 (St. L. Ct. App.
1877).
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result, as represented in this case, is that the requiremens of Rule 85.2116 were
added to the Rule 90 provisions pertaining to notice of summons of garnishment.
The weakness of this case does not, however, lie in the fact that it endorses
the nonmandatory application of Rule 85.21 as much as it lies in the perpetuation
the case gives to a harsh intetpretation of the Rule's requirements. The determina-
tion that Rule 85.21 sets forth nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisites to a valid
garnishment is not new. The rule has different requirements depending upon whether
chattels and evidences of debt, or credits are to be attached.1" If the former are
involved, the sheriff must take them into his custody when they are accessible.' 8
If they are not accessible, he follows the rule entitled "Credits" (Rule 85.21(e))
and must "declare to the debtor of the defendant that he attaches in his hands all
debts due from him to the defendants ... and summons such debtor as garnishee."' 9
Missouri courts have taken this to mean that in attachment proceedings there
were two types of jurisdictions to be achieved: jurisdiction over the person of the
garnishee20 in the form of summons, and jurisdiction over the res or property 21
in the form of seizure or declaration 22 of attachment.23 As a result of the court's
interrelationship of the attachment and garnishment statutes it was determined that
garnishment also required a jurisdiction over the -es, 2 4 in spite of the fact that
the process makes no use of seizure by the levying officer, as does attachment.
2 5
The problem is that while the garnishee can waive defects in attaining personal
jurisdiction over him by appearing,26 answering interrogatories,2 7 or engaging in
trial, 28 jurisdiction over the res can be conferred neither by waiver nor consent,29
16. Substantially the same as Sec. 521.170, RSMo 1959. Rule 85 and chapter
521 are entitled "Attachments."
17. Mo. R. Civ. P. 90.01 and 90.03 (Secs. 525.010 and 525.030, RSMo 1959)
set forth the kinds of property that can be garnished. It is more limited than the
area of property subject to attachment. Mo. Bar, Creditors' Remedies, Attachments
4.6 (1967).
18. Mo. R. Civ. P. 85.21 (d).
19. Mo. R. Civ. P. 85.21 (e).
20. Conner v. Pope, 18 Mo. App. 86, 89 (K.C. Ct. App. 1885).
21. Fletcher v. Wear, 81 Mo. 524, 530 (1884).
22. The declaration or notice required by Mo. R. Civ. P. 85.21 (e) need not
be oral and can be written. Marx v. Hart, 166 Mo. 503, 521, 66 S.W. 260, 266
(1901).
23. Maulsbury v. Farr, 3 Mo. 439 (1834); Norvell v. Porter, 62 Mo. 309
(1876); Conner v. Pope, 18 Mo. App. 86 (K.C. Ct. App. 1885).
24. Fletcher v. Wear, 81 Mo. 524, 530 (1884); Keane v. Bartholow, Lewis &
Co., 4 Mo. App. 507, 508-510 (St. L. Ct. App. 1877).
25. "Garnishment is resorted to in order to avoid the responsibilities incident
to the actual seizure and custody of the property." McGarry v. Lewis Coal Co.,
93 Mo. 237, 240, 6 S.W. 81, 82 (1887).
26. Rallo Contracting v. Blong, 313 S.W.2d 734, 737 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958).
27. Gates v. Tusten, 89 Mo. 13, 21, 14 S.W. 827, 829 (1886); Dodge v. Knapp,
112 Mo. App. 513, 523, 87 S.W. 47, 50 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
28. Epstein v. Salorgne, 6 Mo. App. 352, 354 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878).
29. Epstein v. Salorgne, supra; Gates v. Tusten, 89 Mo. 13, 21, 14 S.W. 827,
829 (1886); Kurre v. American Indemnity Co., 223 Mo. App. 406, 413, 17 S.W.2d
685, 687 (St. L. Ct. App. 1929); State ex rel. Shaw State Bank v. Pfeffle, 220 Mo.
App. 676, 685, 293 S.W. 512, 516 (St. L. Ct. App. 1927).
1969] '
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and defects are held to render the proceedings void and subject to collateral at-
tack.8 0 The practical result is that a garnishee who is aware of a defect in attaining
jurisdiction over the res can, as was done here, stand by mute while the judgment
creditor proceeds headlong towards an unavoidable reversal.
Although the consequences of the doctrine are severe, its rationale is not
wholly unmeritorious. It starts with the proposition that a garnishment proceeding
is quasi in rem.31 Accordingly, it is said, the garnishee has no power to dispense
with that part of the statute which relates not to himself but to the property. He
cannot, in other words, by any voluntary act on his part, waive those requirements
which the statutes prescribe as necessary before the property can be held against
its real owner.32 If, then, the garnishee were not allowed to set up his defense at
any stage of the proceedings he would be "required to put himself in the position of
allowing a judgment to go against him which would be of no protection to him if
he paid it."' 33
The problem with the Missouri approach lies in the effect given the initial
proposition that garnishment is a quasi in rem proceeding. The term "quasi in rem"
conjures thoughts of an action involving a person and a wholly distinct physical
asset. This is unlike the situation in the present case where the property is an
intangible asset. It is doubtful whether an obligation of garnishee to the defendant
can be sufficiently distinguished from the person of the garnishee so as to make
jurisdiction over the res meaningfully different from jurisdiction over the person
in any way other than in terms of the result assigned to the failure to accomplish
the acts said to produce it. This point was emphasized in Harris v. Balk.3 4 There
the garnishee's creditor (the principal defendant in the garnishment process) argued
that a foreign garnishment was void because the situs of the debt was at the
domicile of the debtor and the res was consequently beyond the foreign court's
jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court rejected this contention saying,
If there be a law of the State providing for the attachment of the debt,
then if the garnishee be found in that State, and process be personally
served upon him therein, we think the court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over him, and can garnish the debt due from him to the debtor of the
plaintiff and condemn it, provided the garnishee could himself be sued by
his creditor in that State.3 5
30. Howell v. Sherwood, 213 Mo. 565, 576, 112 S.W. 50, 53 (1908). Federal
Truck Co. v. Mayer, 216 Mo. App. 443, 450, 270 S.W. 407, 409 (St. L. Ct. App.
1925).
31. Epstein v. Salorgne, 6 Mo. App. 352, 354 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878).
32. Trinidad Asphalt Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 214 Mo. App. 115, 258 S.W.
64, 67 (St. L. Ct. App. 1924); Kurre v. American Indemnity, 223 Mo. App. 406,
413, 17 S.W.2d 685, 687 (St. L. Ct. App. 1929); Rallo Contracting Co. v. Blong,
313 S.W.2d 734, 737 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958).
33. Federal Trucking Co. v. Mayer, 216 Mo. App. 443, 450, 270 S.W. 407,
409. See Conner v. Pope, 18 Mo. App. 86, 89 (K.C. Ct. App. 1885).
34. 198 U.S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625, 49 L. Ed. 1023 (1905).
35. Harris v. Balk, supra note 34 at 222, 25 Sup. Ct. at 626, 49 L. Ed. at 1026.
[¥ol. 33
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This case has been cited in several Missouri cases making like holdings on similar
facts.36
If the debt goes with the debtor when he journeys into a foreign state, it
should likewise accompany him when he responds to personal summons and enters
circuit court. Any further conceptual definitiveness is difficult and arguably mean-
ingless. It would seem that when jurisdiction is conferred over the garnishee-obligor
it is also confirmed over the obligation, and subsequent actions by the judgment
debtor against the garnishee should be subject to the defense of payment 3 7
Perhaps the concern about the garnishee's possible double liability stems from
an undiscussed recognition of the ludicrousness of the sheriff declaring that an
intangible has been attached in his hands. Since it has been held that jurisdiction
over the res cannot otherwise be achieved, one party must be adversely affected
when the declaration is not made. The court may in effect be saying that the risk
of nonperformance of this valueless ritual should not be imposed upon a garnishee
who is only a third party, and therefore it must rest with the judgment creditor.
The better solution, however, would be to spurn the unnecessary distinction and
impose no burden at all.
If the notion that the declaration should be jurisdictional and mandatory is
cause for disagreement, the real holding of this case might give rise to revolt. This
is the ratification of the rule that, "to confer jurisdiction over the res in a garnish-
36. State v. Kirkwood, 345 Mo. 1089, 138 S.W.2d 1009 (1940); Western
Assurance Co. v. Walden, 238 Mo. 49, 141 S.W. 595 (1911); See also: Wyeth
Hardware Co. v. Lang & Co., 127 Mo. 242, 29 S.W. 1010, 27 L. R. A. 651, 48
Am. St. Rep. 626 (1895); Howland v. Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Ry., 134
Mo. 474, 36 S.W. 29 (1896); State ex rel. Richardson v. Mueller, 230 Mo. App.
962, 90 S.W.2d 171 (St. L. Ct. App. 1936).
37. There is language in Missouri cases to support this proposition. See Dodge
v. Knapp, 112 Mo. App. 513, 522, 87 S.W. 47, 50 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905); Potter
v. Whitten, 161 Mo. App. 118, 130, 131, 142 S.W. 453 (Spr. Ct. App. 1912);
Western Stoneware Co. v. Pike County Mineral Spring Co., 172 Mo. App. 696, 704,
155 S.W. 1083 (St. L. Ct. App. 1913); Mound City Engraving Co. v. Mobile &
Ohio Ry. Co., 146 Mo. App. 463, 470, 124 S.W. 27 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910). These
cases were overruled to the extent they were contrary to Federal Truck Co. v.
Mayer, 216 Mo. App. 443, 450, 270 S.W. 407, 409 (St. L. Ct. App. 1925).
The concept of jurisdiction over a res seems inconsistent with Missouri rulings
that garnishment creates no lien on the property of the defendant in the hands of
the garnishee. McGarry v. Lewis Coal Co., 93 Mo. 237, 6 S.W. 81 (1887); Marx
v. Hart, 166 Mo. 503, 66 S.W. 260 (1901); Dodge v. Knapp, 112 Mo. App. 513, 87
S.W. 47 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
In the leading case, McGarry v. Lewis Coal, suzpra, the court said:
Garnishment is, as the term implies, a warning to the garnishee not to dis-
pose of the property of the defendant in his hands, and that, if he does so
dispose of the same, he will subject himself to personal liability for the
value, to the extent at least, of the plaintiff's debt or claim. Ordinarily
property is not deemed to be in the custody of the law until actually
seized and reduced to possession by the officer. McGarry, supra at 240, 6
S.W. at 82.
It would seem that if only personal liability is obtained by the garnishment,
only personal jurisdiction would be necessary to make the process effective.
1968]
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ment proceeding, the officer's return38 must affirmatively show substantial com-
pliance with essential requirements including the injunction ... [of Rule 85.21(e);
§ 521.170(5).,"39 The exasperated creditor now finds himself with a judgment that
is vulnerable not just because the sheriff failed to recite precise words to the gar-
nishee, but because the sheriff failed to show in the return that there was such a
recital.40 Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether the making of the declaration
is even of any significance. At earlier points along this line of cases it has been said
that "the only legitimate evidence" of attachment or garnishment is to be found in
the writ,41 and that "it is the return of the officer upon the writ which constitutes
the attachment of the debt due."42 Given this language, it would not be preposterous
to one day receive a holding that jurisdiction over the res is conferred by a proper
return even though no notice was in fact given.
This decision does not introduce any new theoretical concepts or practical
problems to the Missouri law. It is significant only in that it perpetuates an inter-
pretation of the statutes that has made the garnishment process exceedingly un-
glamourous to judgment creditors. When it is considered alongside two other
harsh Missouri rulings, one of which overrules as premature default judgments that
are rendered prior to a determination of the amount the garnishee owes the judgment
creditor,43 and the other which allows no lien upon notice of summons of garnish-
ment,44 the judicial inclination to strictly construe garnishment statutes45 appears
38. The officer's return is made upon the writ of execution itself and not
upon the summons of garnishment. Mo. Bar, Creditors' Remedies, Garnish'ment
§ 3.7 (1967).
39. Fulkerson v. Laird, 421 S.W.2d 523, 526 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
40. In Kansas & T. Coal Co. v. Adams, 99 Mo. App. 474, 74 S.W. 158
(K.C. Ct. App. 1903), the Constables return stated, "I hereby certify that I
delivered a true copy of the within summons to W. R. Vail, . . . attaching in his
hands the money of said defendant." Kansas & T. Coal Co. v. Adams, supra at 480,
74 S.W. at 160. The court held the return inadequate to establish jurisdiction over
the res because it did not show the declaration of attachment was made. For
a form for an appropriate return, see Mo. Bar, Creditors' Remedies, § 3.7 (1967).
41. Norvell v. Porter, 62 Mo. 309, 311 (1876). Many jurisdictions say the
sheriff's return is only good evidence that acts in question were performed rather
than being determinative. See 6 AM. Jun. 2d Attachment and Garnishment, §§ 325,
326 (1967).
42. Gates v. Tusten, 89 Mo. 13, 21, 14 S.W. 827, 829 (1886). Nineteenth
century treatises state this proposition as "black-letter law" but rely almost ex-
clusively on Missouri cases, cited infra, for support. See DRAKE, ATrACHmENT,
§ 451(d) (7th ed. 1891); 2 SHINN, ATrACHMENTS AND GARNismvIENT § 611(f)
(1896).
43. Chenowith v. La Master, 342 S.W.2d 500, 501, 502 (Spr. Mo. App. 1961).
This means that the interrogatories provided for in Mo. R. Civ. P. 90.12, 90.13
can be ignored by the garnishee without consequence unless the judgment creditor
is willing to "attach" the body of the garnishee as provided in rule 90.13. Without
the information from the interrogatories the judgment creditor has little oppor-
tunity to determine the amount due from the garnishee to the judgment debtor
and cannot set forth in the default judgment the exact amount garnished. The
anomalous result is that the garnishee, by refusing to answer, is able to negate
the penalty for refusing to answer.
44. McGarry v. Lewis Coal Co., 93 Mo. 237, 6 S.W. 81 (1887). See note 37,
sup ra.
45. See note 4, supra.
[Vol. 33
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to amount to a conscious preference for debtors. At any rate, the annoying pitfall
here approved only weakens further the garnishment process as a method of collect-
ing perfectly legitimate debts.
ALAN L. ATrEBURY
TORTS-VIOLATION OF CRIMINAL STATUTE AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE
Siess v. Laytonl
Plaintiff, Siess, by next friend,2 sued for damages for injuries sustained in an
intersection collision with defendant's automobile. At the time of the collision
plaintiff was operating a motorbike. Interrogatories revealed that plaintiff was
fourteen-years-old and driving in violation of Missouri statutes requiring drivers
of motorbikes to be licensed.3 Defendant sought summary judgment, contending
that plaintiff's violation of the licensing statutes constituted contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law. The trial court held that plaintiff had no cause of action
because plaintiff was "incompetent as a matter of law."4 For this reason the
court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal to the Mis-
souri Supreme Court, the rendition of the summary judgment was reversed. The
court found no causal connection between the violation of the licensing statutes
and the injury and reasserted this as a valid exception to the negligence per se rule.
As a preliminary matter, attention is directed to the fact that the noted case
involves the relatively infrequent assertion of contributory negligence per se.
While some early cases held that a plaintiff has no cause of action if he was
engaging in illegal conduct at the time of the event which forms the basis of his
suit,5 the generally accepted rule today is that in this respect a plaintiff stands
on the same footing as a defendant who breaches a statute-he is no better off
1. 417 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1967).
2. See § 517.190, RSMo 1959.
3. § 302.020, RSMo 1959:
It shall be unlawful for any person to . . . (2) Drive other than as a
chauffeur any motor vehicle ... upon any highway of this state unless
such person has a valid license as an operator under the provisions of this
chapter .. o. .
§ 564.470, RSMo 1959:
1. No person under the age of sixteen years shall operate a motor
vehicle on, the highways of this state.
4. The majority of jurisdictions, including Missouri, do not require that the
plaintiff prove freedom from contributory negligence in order to recover, con-
tributory negligence being an affirmative defense. Here the defense may deny
Siess a recovery, but he clearly had a cause of action, and the trial court decision
may be criticized if for no other reason than the use of such language.
5. Patrican v. Garvey, 287 Mass. 62, 190 N.E. 9 (1934); Masters v. Von
Lehmden, 36 Ohio App. 414, 173 N.E. 303 (1930) (Last clear chance not available);
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and no worse off.6 In practice, however, a plaintiff who has violated a statute may
suffer less prejudice than a defendant,7 the reason being an observable distaste
for contributory negligence as a defense, regardless of form.8 Thus, while the
discussion which follows is cast in terms of primary negligence per se, the formal
principles apply with equal force to the proof of plaintiff's contributory negligence-
even though juries and courts may be less exacting in the application of such
principles to evaluate the plaintiff's conduct.9
The purpose of a civil action is to adjust private rights between the litigants.
The plaintiff, in order to recover, is required to show a reason for shifting the
loss, i.e., defendant's negligence, 10 and an important part of this proof consists of
showing what the "ordinarily careful and prudent person"" would do under
similar circumstances. Typically, the negligence-or fault-issue is decided by
the jury, which determines both the facts of the defendant's conduct, and "whethier
this conduct was justifiable or should be condemned." 12 The doctrine of negli-
gence per se does away with this weighing process by the jury, and, as classically
enunciated by Thayer,13 does so in a deceptively simple manner, viz., reasonable
men do not break the law and such conduct, being unreasonable, is, a fortiori,
negligent. Missouri has long been among the majority of jurisdictions which holds
that the violation of a criminal statute is negligence per se.' 4 The proliferation of
law at every level of government has made it increasingly difficult, however, to
apply the doctrine literally,15 and two escapes have been devised.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 285 (1965); PROSSER, TORTS 204 (3d
ed. 1964). Contra, 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 996-97 (1956) ("The doctrine ap-
pears to be a barbarous relic of the worst there was in puritanism.")
7. Williams v. Black, 147 Tenn. 331, 247 S.W. 95 (1923) (Special considera-
tions given minors in determining contributory negligence held to prevail over a
violation of statute as negligence per se); Morby v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252
P.2d 231 (1953) (Same).
8. PROSSER, TORTS 428 (3d ed. 1964). See generally 65A C.J.S., Negligence,
§ 127 (1966).
9. The Missouri Approved Jury Instructions do not distinguish between
defendant's "primary" and plaintiff's "contributory" negligence in providing for
instructions on this issue. See, e.g., Mo. APPROVED INSTR. §§ 11.01-.03, 17.01, 28.01
(1964).
10. "Sound policy lets losses lie where they fall, except where special reason
can be shown for interference." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881).
11. See, e.g., Mo. APPROVED INSTR. § 11.02 (1964).
12. Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv.
L. REv. 453 (1933). In PROSSER, TORTS 16-26 (3d ed. 1964), are set out six gen-
eral considerations usually involved in this balancing of conflicting interests: (1)
The moral aspect of defendant's conduct, (2) the historical development, (3) the
convenience of administration, (4) the capacity to bear loss, (5) the aspect of
preventon and punishment, and (6) the motive.
13. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REv. 317 (1914).
14. Missouri applies the same rule to ordinances, administrative regulations,
and, at times, even custom. Unless otherwise indicated, "statute" includes ordi-
nances and administrative regulations. Gas Service Co. v. Helmers, 179 F.2d 101
(8th Cir. 1950)(custom); Fields v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 374 S.W.2d 17
(Mo. 1963) (administrative regulation); Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco Co., 115
S.W.2d 219 (St. L. Mo. App. 1938) (ordinance); Beck v. Wurst Coal & Hauling
Co., 293 S.W. 449 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927) (statute).
15. Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM.
L. REV. 21 (1949).
[Vol. 33
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1968], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss3/9
RECENT CASES
A strong minority of jurisdictions has rejected the negligence per se doctrine
and hold, instead, that violation of a statute is merely evidence of negligence to be
considered by the jury along with all other evidence.' 0 This theory asserts that a
violation of a statute causes no injury; that it is the act or omission which is
relevant; and that this should be governed by the reasonable man standard. 17
The majority of jurisdictions follows a "negligence per se' theory, but avoids
the harsh results by applying a number of exceptions. The practical effect of this
approach is to permit the judge to look at the criminal statute; to determine
if the standard is applicable to the situation; and, if it is, to use that standard in
place of the reasonable man test, leaving the jury only the factual question of
whether or not there was a violation. If the criminal standard is deemed inapplica-
ble by the judge, then the jury decides both the reasonable man standard and
the question of its violation. 8 In this respect the difference between the majority
and the minority may be more formal than real.
Missouri seems to follow the majority approach and recognizes eight excep-
tions to the negligence per se rule, one of which (No. "8," below) is applicable
only when the violation of the statute is alleged to be contributory negligence.
These exceptions apply when:
(1) The application of the statute is unconstitutional; 19
(2) The statute was not in fact violated;20
(3) There was legal justification for the violation;21
(4) The injured plaintiff was not within the class meant to be pro-
tected;22
(5) The violation was not the proximate cause of the injury;2 3
16. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L.
REv. 361 (1932). Lowndes has been the most articulate spokesman for this view-
point. For an example of this type case, see Fimple v. Archer Ballroom Co., 150
Neb. 681, 35 N.W.2d 680 (1949).
17. Lowndes, supra note 16, 16 MINN. L. Ray. at 371.
18. Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HtAv. L.
REv. 453 (1933), and The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49
COLUM. L. REv. 21 (1949). For a good comparison of the Morris and Lowndes
positions, see Comment, 1950 WASH. U.L.Q. 280 (1950).
19. Note, however, the mere fact the statute itself is unconstitutional is not
necessarily a defense if the court finds the standard a valid measure of negligence:
Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal.2d 72, 75, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (1943); Hartley v.
McKee, 86 S.W.2d 359, 361 (St. L. Mo. App. 1935)(by implication); Rudes v.
Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 555-56, 324 S.W.2d 201, 204 (1959).
20. Beezley v. Spiva, 313 S.W.2d 691, 695 (Mo. 1958); Gower v. Lamb, 282
S.W.2d 867, 869 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955).
21. Bowman v. Ryan, 343 S.W.2d 613, 622 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Mac-
Arthur v. Gendron, 312 S.W.2d 146, 150 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958).
22. Kuba v. Nagel, 124 S.W.2d 597, 600 (St. L. Mo. App. 1939); Mansfield
v. Wagner Electric Mfg. Co., 294 Mo. 235, 241, 242 S.W. 400, 403 (1922) (Cited
by Morris, supra note 18, 46 HARv. L. REy. at 473, as a bad application of the
doubtful rule of Gorris v. Scott.)
23. Siess v. Layton, 417 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. 1967); Bowman v. Heffron, 318
S.W.2d 269, 274 (Mo. 1948) (contributory negligence per se); Harris v. Hughes,
266 S.W.2d 763, 770 (K.C. Mo. App. 1954).
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(6) Even though the injured party is within the class meant to be
protected, the injury is so variant as to not be within the ifitendment of
the statute;2 4  
.
(7). The plaintiff induced the violation and is thereby estopped to
assert it;25 and
(8) The violation by the plaintiff was contributory negligence, but
the defendant remains liable under the Humanitarian Doctrine or some
other doctrine in mitigation of the classic defenses of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk.28
Despite formal allegiance to the majority position, the language used by the
courts suggests that Missouri, in practice, is an "evidence of negligence" jurisdic-
tion. Thus, in Lochmoeler v. Kiel,2T the court said that proof of a violation made
a "prima facie" case for the jury. One year later in Cantwell v. Cremins28 the
court said that the "rule in both Illinois and Missouri and in most of the states
is that a violation of a statute is evidence of negligence," and as late as 1963 the
court. stated that such a violation, is a fact merely "tending to prove" negligence.
29
Expressions such as these, when coupled with the rather broad exceptions observed
in Missouri, leave little substance to the negligence per se rule.
Although the practical consequences are arguably the same, it is submitted
the "evidence of negligence" rule is preferable. This follows for at least two reasons.
First, the negligence per se rule can be viewed as inconsistent with what is called
"due process of law."3 0 Thus, while the legislature is competent to change rules
of evidence, and may create certain presumptions, there must be a rational con-
nection between the fact proved and the conclusion inferred therefrom.31 Similarly,
the inference cannot rise to the level of a conclusive presumption unless the fact
24. Rutledge v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 110 Mo. 312, 322, 19 S.W. 38, 40 (1892)
(Statute required "blocking" to prevent feet and legs from being injured. Plaintiff
was thrown from the top of a railroad car and caught his arm in unblocked space.)
25. Cf. Borrini v. Pevely Dairy Co., 183 S.W.2d 839, 844 (St. L. Mo. App.
1944); Stack v. General Baking Co., 283 Mo. 396, 414, 223 S.W. 89, 94 (1920).
These cases do not speak in terms of "estoppel," but the idea is implicit and the
facts fit quite neatly into an estoppel analysis. See also, Annots., '47 A.L.R.2d 6,
69 (1956), 63 A.L.R. 277, 280 (1929).
26. This is supported by a multitude of Missouri cases, e.g., Worth v. St.
Louis-S.F. Ry. Co., 334 Mo. 1025, 1029-30, 69 S.W.2d 672, 674 (1934), and should
remain true when the contributory negligence is a violation of statute. For a- case
so holding see Arnold v. Owens, 78 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1935).
27. 137 S.W.2d 625, 630 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940).
28. 347 Mo. 836, 842, 149 S.W.2d 343, 346 (1941) (emphasis added).
29. Grimes v. Standard Oil Co., 370 S.W.2d 627, 634 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963).
30. It is arguable that the doctrine may also create an undue burden upon
interstate commerce by the possible imposition of a different standard of care
every few miles through the penal laws of ever village, city and state. Research
has yielded no specific case, but an analogy may be drawn from New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), wherein a state's tort law was held offehsive to
first amendment freedoms.
31. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943); City of St. Louis v.
Cook, 359 Mo. 270, 275, 221 S.W.2d 468, 470 (1949).
[Vol. 33
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proved is, by itself, conclusive evidence of the legal conclusion inferred3 2 And,
finally, a fair opportunity to overcome a statutory presumption must be available 33
Departure from any one of the foregoing requirements is, arguably, a viola-
tion of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In other words, if,
under that due process clause, a legislature cannot provide that the operation of a
bus above a speed of 25 m.p.h. within a city shall be "proof" of imprudent
driving,34 how can a trial judge reach the same result by holding that the viola-
tion of a penal standard creates a conclusive presumption of "'imprudent driving"
via the negligence per se rule?
Second, the negligence per se rule may produce an "overbreadth" in that it
may subject the defendant to losses disproportionate to wrongs which in other
contexts are minor, or petty.85 Where the legislation does not even speak to civil
litigation as such, these results are difficult to explain.36 It is submitted that
evidence of the mere fact of violation places the defendant at a considerable
disadvantage even without the negligence per se rule:
Unless the jury are exceptionally discriminating, however, it is very
doubtful whether the carelessness of the defendant in failing to conform
to the statute will impress them as much as the illegality of his actions.
As a matter of fact, the jury will be more apt to decide against the de-
fendant because he has violated the law than because of any absence of
due care.3 7
In summary, Missouri's adherence to negligence per se language creates more
difficulties than it is worth.38 Since negligence per se has been abandoned in all
but name, it is difficult to see what disadvantages would result were the doctrine
frankly and- explicitly repudiated. In substitution, a theory similar to that ad-
vanced by the Restatement39 would bring theory into greater harmony with
practice. CLIFFORD S. BROWN
32. Mobile, J. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910); O'Donnell v.
Wells, 323 Mo. 1170, 21 S.W.2d 762 (1929).
33. Western & Ati. R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
34. O'Donnell v. Wells, 323 Mo. 1170, 21 S.W.2d 762 (1929).
35. -Morris, supra note 18, 46 HAnv. L. REv. at 469. Morris has also pointed
out that "When prudence justifies conduct that is nevertheless criminal, civil
liability for harm done is liability without fault." MoRIus, TORTS 65 (1953).
36. FISHER, VEHICLE TRAFFIC LAW 56-57 (1961), speaking in reference to
automobile laws only, states:
For a great many sound and cogent reasons the civil and criminal
aspects of traffic laws should be divorced. While the same regulatory
measure figures in both a prosecution for violation and a subsequent dam-
agesuit, the purposes of the two actions are utterly divergent. The prosecu-
tion is to vindicate public interest in compelling adherence to laws en-
acted for the promotion of its safety and security; the damage suit is to
secure an adjustment of purely private rights as between two individuals,
plaintiff and defendant.
37. Lowndes, supra note 16, 16 MINN. L. REV. at 369.
38. Bracken v. Koch, 404 S.W.2d 201 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966), decided the
same question involved in the noted case in the same way. Yet, here another
litigant is being forced to take an appeal "all the way" because of negligence per se
language in an earlier case.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §§ 285-86 (1965).,
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JURY VERDICT-INVALIDITY DUE TO JUROR NON-PARTICIPATION
City of Flat River v. Edgar'
The jury panel in City of Flat River v. Edgar2 was asked the usual voir dire
question-"whether any one of them knew of any reason why -he couldn't render
a fair and impartial verdict . ... ', No member of the panel gave any express
answer. Thereafter, a nine-man verdict was returned and judgment entered on the
condemnation award in issue.
Defendant procured the jury foreman's deposition stating that two jurors had
refused, on religious grounds, to take part in the jury's deliberations. He stated
that neither juror had participated in either the discussions or the balloting. De-
fendant made a timely motion for a new trial, basing it in part on the non-partici-
pation of these two jurors and counsel's reasonable diligence in trying to discover
their intent to create this defect. Plaintiff objected, both at the taking of the deposi-
tion and at the hearing on defendant's motion, that the foreman's testimony was
incompetent to impeach the jury's verdict. The trial court overruled plaintiff's
objection and ordered a new trial. The St. Louis Court of Appeals affirmed, hold-
ing: (1) The constitutional guarantee of "trial" by twelve impartial jurors re-
quires all of them to deliberate; (2) Juror testimony is admissible when directed
to constitutionally required juror competency; and, (3) Failure to disclose intent
not to participate in response to the voir dire question was a false representation
resulting directly in juror disqualification 4
As argued by the plaintiff in Edgar, jurors generally are incompetent to im-
peach their own verdicts.5 This is the firm rule in Missouri and most states as to
matters concerning the jurors' manner of arriving at their verdict.6 Juror testimony
1. 412 S.W.2d 537 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
2. Id., hereinafter cited as Edgar.
3. Id., at 539.
4. Id., at 539-540.
5. E.g., Romandel v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 254 S.W.2d 585, 595 (Mo.
1953). Cf., Justice Cardozo's opinion in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13(1932), approving Wigmore's analogizing the bar to juror verdict-impeaching
testimony as a "privilege" rather than as a question of witness competency or public
policy. This so-called "privilege" would seem to be properly assertable only by thejuror involved rather than by one of the parties allegedly affected by the improper
verdict. In the Clark case, the privilege was asserted in defense of a criminal con-
tempt charge. The question does not seem to be the competency of the juror to
testify, but removal of potential testimonial pressures as a bar to free debate and
thought processes during deliberations. "Public (or judicial) policy" would appear
to be a more appropriate ground for the testimonial bar-as distinguished fromjuror "competency" in the sense of capacity and ability to so act. Thus, the rule
might be more accurately stated, "Jurors may not impeach their own verdicts,
because to do so would be contrary to the public (or judicial) policy of promoting
free debate and thought processes during jury deliberations." See 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 2345, 2352-2354 (3rd ed. 1940); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EvI-
DENCE 130-131 (Mo. Bar spec. ed. 1961).
6. E.g., Reich v. Thompson, 346 Mo. 577, 142 S.W.2d 486 (1940) (juror
testimony inadmissible, but eavesdroppers testimony to same matters admissible).
[V 61. 33
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is admissible, however, to show an actual lack of competence to act as a juror,7
unless such objections are of a type which are waivable and have been waived.8
Edgar does not involve that confused area of the law concerning improper juror
activity during deliberations.9 Rather, it involves juror inactivity during delibera-
tions. Such inactivity, the court's decision seems to broadly hold, is a competency
disquaiification of clearly constitutional stature.
The right of trial by a fair and impartial jury has been long enshrined by
royal contract'0 and successor constitutional guaranties." Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that irregularities in juror qualification which are deemed to sufficiently
impair this right may also rise to a constitutional level.' 2 In this regard, there is
an important, somewhat procedural, distinction between serious or constitutional
irregularities and less important or non-constitutional irregularities in juror quali-
fication. Objections to individual prospective jurors are by two kinds of challenges:
peremptory and for cause; and, each party has, not a right to select, but, a right to
reject prospective jurors in order to obtain a fair and impartial jury.' 3 First, each
party challenges for cause those on the panel for whom legal cause has been dis-
closed or discovered. Then, peremptory challenges are exercised arbitrarily within
each party's sole discretion. 14 Thus, if circumstances exist which unreasonably pro-
hibit a party from ascertaining or exercising a sufficiently serious (or constitutional)
cause for challenging, to that extent the right to intelligently exercise peremptory
challenges is impaired.15 In this situation a new trial is constitutionally required-
See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2354 (3rd ed. 1940); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 83-85 (Mo. Bar spec. ed. 1961) and LAUER, SPECIAL MISSOURI PocKET
PART thereto, at 44; Note, COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1947).
7. Generally, Annot. 48 A.L.R.2d 971 (1956). Particular bases and grounds
are discussed in detail later in the text.
8. E.g., State v. Crawford, 416 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1967); Rose v. Sheedy,
345 Mo. 610, 134 S.W.2d 18 (1939); Harding v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 27 S.W.2d 778,
(St. L. Mo. App. 1930).
9.. This area, including particularly quotient verdicts, will be presented in a
comment to be published in a future issue of this law review. See the authorities
and references in note 6 supra; Annots. 73 A.L.R. 93 (1931) (majority verdicts),
52 A.L.R. 41 (1928) (quotient verdicts).
10. See, e.g., Justice Black's impassioned summary, in Republic Steel Corp.
v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 669 (1965) (dissent), in favor of the right to a jury trial
(existing from at least the time of the Magna Carta) rather than submission to
internal labor union governing powers derived from statute, as found by the
Court's majority.
11. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, and amend. VI and VII; Mo. CONST.
art. I, § 22(a). That the tests are the same for civil and criminal cases, see Annot.
50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 933, 936-938 (1914).
12. E.g., Moore v. Middlewest Freightways, Inc., 266 S.W.2d 578, 586 (Mo.
1954); Privitt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 300 S.W. 726, 728 (Mo. 1927);
City of Flat River v. Edgar, 412 S.W.2d 537, 539 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967); Durham
v. State, 182 Tenn. 577, 188 S.W.2d 555 (1945). See also, e.g., Lee v. Baltimore
Hotel Co., 345 Mo. 458, 463-464, 136 S.W.2d 695, 697 (1939), quoting Harding
v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 27 S.W.2d 778, 779 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930).
13. State v. Levy, 187 N.C. 581, 587, 122 S.E. 386, 390 (1924).
14. Id., at 584, 122 S.E. at 388.
15. E.g., Moore v. Middlewest Freightways, Inc., 266 S.W.2d 578, 586 (Mo.
1954); State v. Taylor, 64 Mo. 358, 363 (1877); Sadlon v. Richardson, 382
S.W.2d 9, 12 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964). The inter-relationships between peremptory
1968]' ' 495
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not, because- the right to peremptorily 'challenge is itself constitutional, but" because
the challegge for cause is sufficiently serious to be classified a§ constitutional, and
the resulting loss of freedom in exercising peremptory challenges: is thereby consti-
tuted prejudicial per se.16 Accordingly, constitutional challenges for. cause are. in-
herently prejudicial; while non-constitutional challenges are not. This. procedural
introduction, however, begs the ultimate questions. First, what .are. constitutional
and what are non-constitutional causes for prospective juror challenge? Second,
what procedures are necessary to safeguard the availability of remedies for consti-
tutional and non-constitutional challenges of jurors? Finally, what remedies are
available or are appropriate where constitutional or non-constitutional causes for
juror challenges are either undisclosed or undiscovered?
The determination of juror competence, in the sense of capacity and qualifi-
catiorr to so act, has been confusingly generalized in many modem decisions.17
Although now partially codified, 18 categorical objections to individual juror com-
petence were originally derived from the common law,' 9 along with the right of
trial by jury itself.2 0 Today, two general categories of grounds for challenging juror
competence survive: (1) Lack of some special legal qualification; 2x and, (2)
challenges and those for cause are nicely set forth in State v. Levy, 187 N.C. 581,
584-585, 122 S.E. 386, 388 (1924), which includes a quotation from the rationale
stated in Blackstone's Commentaries (4 Bl. Com. 353) reading, in, part: "Because,
upon challenges for cause shown, if the reason assigned prove insufficient to set
aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes pro-
voke a resentment; to prevent all ill consequences from which, the prisoner is still
at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him aside." While cited with respect to
a criminal case jury, the same rationale applies equally for a civil case jury. Annot.
50 LR.A.(N.S.) 933, 936-938 (1914).
16. This conclusion apparently results because the "right" to exercise per-
emptory challenges existing at early common law (see note 15 supra) is a right
"heretofore enjoyed" and therefore accorded constitutional protection in Missouri.
See Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 22(a); cases cited in note 12 supra. See also, discussion
on this point in note 44 infra.
17. Compare Romandel v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 254 S.W.2d 585, 595
(Mo. 1953) (juror testimonial "competency"); Reich v. Thompson, 346 Mo. 577,
142 S.W.2d 486 (1940) (same); and, City of Flat River v. Edgar, 412 S.W.2d
537 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967) (juror action "competency") with. State v. Levy, 187
N.C. 581, 585-588, 122 S.E. 386, 388-390 (1924) (individual juror challenge for
cause);
18.. Details of Missouri's codifications are summarized in the following text
and footnotes. See constitutional provisions in the text accompanying aid in notes
38, 39 and 40 infra; Statutory provisions summarized in note 33 infra.
19. "At common law, challenges to the polls were divided into four classes:
(1) propter respectum, as where the juror was a lord of Parliament, when
he could be challenged by either side or by himself; (2) propter defectwum,
being a lack of some qualification required by law, such as residence, age,
property, etc.; (3) propter affectum, on account of bias, suspicion or
[sic] partiality, prejudice, or the like; and (4) propter delictum, f6r crimi-
nality, as where the jurors had been convicted of an infamous crime.!'
State v. Levy, 187 N.C. 581, 585, 122 S.E. 386, 388-389 (1924); Annot. 50
L.R.A.(N.S.) 933, 935-938, 946-949, 965-966 (1914).
20. State v. Levy, supra note 19, at 584, 122 S.E. at 388; U.S. CONST. amend.
VII; Mo. CONsT. art. I, § 22(a).
21. Common law challenge classes 1, 2 and 4 as set forth in the quotation
from State v. Levy, in note 19 supra. See also, Annot. 50 L.R.A.(NS.) 933, 935
(1914). Cf., Missouri's statutes summarized' in note 33 infra.
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Disqualification for bias, prejudice, or the like.22 The latter category4 gijing ,directly
to the fairness and impartiality of the juror, is clearly of a constitutional-,level, 23
Under the Common law, this category was called propter affectuim.24 It could
not- be waived if a party exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to discover
such grounds,2 5 and could be asserted to overturn the verdict ev~h long after
judgment 26 Included now, as then, are such matters as interest. in the cause,27
relation to the parties,28 connection with the parties' attorneys,2 9 and direct bias
or prejudice for or against either of the parties.30 The other surviving category of
juror challenges, lack of special legal qualifications, is a combination of the other
22. Common law challenge class 3 set forth in the quotation from State v.
Levy, in note'19 supra. See also, Annot. 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 933, 935 (1914). Cf.,
Missouri's statutes summarized in note 33 infra.
23. E.g., Moore v. Middlewest Freightways, Inc., 266 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. 1954).
24. See note 19 supra.
25." State v. Brockhaus, 72 Conn. 109, 43 Atl. 850 (1899). See also; Lee v.
Baltimore Hotel Co., 345 Mo. 458, 463-464, 136 S.W.2d 695, 697 (1939), quoting
Harding v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 27 S.W.2d 778, 779 (1939); State v. Levy, 187 N.C.
581, 588, 122 S.E. 386, 390 (1924).
26. E.g.; State v. Williams, 9 Del. 508, 18 Atl. 949 (1890) (common law);
Smith v. State, 2 GaApp. 574, 59 S.E. 311 (1907) (motion effective six months
after verdict but new trial denied; longer periods probably allowed on rationale
stated). Cf., Harding v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 27 S.W.2d 788 (St. L. Mo.,.App. 1930)
(on motion for new trial); Lee v. Baltimore Hotel Co., 345 Mo. 458, 136 S.W.2d
695 (1939) (by court during trial term, but after time for new trial motion). See
also, Ballard v. Van Tuyl, 142 App.Div. 278, 126 N.Y.Supp. 820' (1911), where a
statute allowed challenge within six months of the verdict for relation of juror to
another party.
27. E.g., Barb v. Farmers' Ins. Exch., 281 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. 1955) (mutual
insurance, company policyholders); Page v. Contoocook Valley R. Co., 21 N.H. 438
(1850) (shareholder). See § 494.190 RSMo (1959). See also, Wilder v. Louisville
Ry. Co., 157 Ky. 17, 162 S.W. 557 (1914) (interest in another suit by sister against
defendant). Such cases are often considered a matter of relationship, rather than
interest in the cause. The Barb case, supra, is so classified under Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 494.190 (1959).
.28.' E.g.; State v. Harris, 69 W.Va. 244, 71 S.E. 609 (1911) (co.u t's opinion
by dissenting judge stating common law); Annot. 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 933, 953, 961,
968-969 (1914). See §§ 494.020(7) (Supp. 1967), 494.190 and 495.150.RSMo (1959).
But see Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Williams, 164 Tenn. 144, 46 S.W.2d 815
(1932) (relation of juror and plaintiff within sixth degree contra statut unknown
by juror until after verdict given; no new trial). See also, Annot. 85 A.L.R.2d
851 (1962) (relation to witness).
29. E.g., Privitt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 300 S.W. 726 (Mo. 1927).
See-§§ 474.020(7) (Supp. 1967) and 475.150 RSMo (1959).
30: E.g., Chouteau v. Pierre, 9 Mo. 3 (1845) (slavery lawful, !freedom of
slave in issue; error to refuse voir dire question on panel member's views); Gibney
v. St.. Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 704, 103 S.W. 43 (1907) (juror a leader of violent
strike against defendant within three years of suit; non-disclosure as falsh voir dire
answer); Piehler v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 357 Mo. 866, 211 S.W.2d 459
(1948) (unsettled juror claim against defendant; non-disclosure'as false voir dire
answer). While religious belief is usually'excluded as improper voir dire, if direct
relation to-potential bias can be shown on the facts of a particular, case, such voir
dire may be allowed. Smith v. Smith, 7.Cal.App.2d 271, 46'P.2d 232 (1935). See
§§ 494.020(7) (Supp. 1967), 494.190 and 495.150 RSMo (1959).
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common law grounds.s l It is now categorized under the common law tag of propter
defect uM,3 2 and covers most of the grounds now codified by statlte.33 Such
31. Propter respectum--lord of Parliament (See § 494.031(7) RSMo (1959),
excuse from jury duty for government officer or employee); Propter defectum,-
some qualification required by law (See §§ 494.010, .020 (Supp. 1967.), except
.020(1) and (7) (Supp. 1967), RSMo (1959), qualifications and ineligibilities);
and propter delictum-criminality (See § 494.020(1) RSMo (Supp. 1967)). State
v. Levy, 187 N.C. 581, 585, 122 S.E. 386, 389 (1924); Annot. 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 933,
935-936 (1914). See also, generally, Annot. 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 933 (1914) for
summaries of other types of qualifications and eligibilities now classified under the
general propter defectum label: I.e., member of grand jury indicting defendant,
member of jury on former trial, age, alienage, property qualifications, residence,
elector status, ignorance of language, and deafness or bad eyesight.
32. State v. Levy, supra note 31, State v. Brockhaus, 72 Conn. 109, 43 Ati.
850 (1899).
33. The following are Missouri's statutory provisions, briefly identified, and
partially quoted, partially summarized:
Ch. 494-GENERAL PROVISIONS AS TO JURIES
Section 494.010 RSMo 1959---Qualifications of jurors.
Every juror, grand or petit, shall be a citizen of the state, a resident
of the county or of a city not within a county for which the jury
may be impaneled; sober and intelligent, of good reputation, over
twenty-one years of age and otherwise qualified.
Section 494.020 RSMo (Supp. 1967)-Persons ineligible for service.
The following persons shall be ineligible to serve as a juror, either
grand or petit:
(1) Any person who has been convicted of a felony, unless such
person has been restored to his civil rights, or of a misdemeanor in-
volving moral turpitude;
(2) Any person who is unable to read, write, speak and under-
stand the English language;
(3) Any person on active duty in the armed forces of the United
States or any member of the organized militia on active duty under
order of the governor;
(4) Any licensed attorney at law;
(5) Any judge of a court of record;
(6) Any person who, in the judgment of the court or other au-
thority charged with the duty of selecting jurors, is incapable of per-
forming the duties of a juror because of mental or physical illness or
infirmity;
(7) Any person not drawn or selected according to the applica-
ble provisions of chapters 494, 495, 496, 497, 498 or 499, RSMo, as
amended. (summarized as here relevant)
Section 494.040 RSMo 1959-Inhabitants of county or city not disquali-
fied when county is a party.
In all actions brought by or against any county or city, the inhabitants
of the county or city so suing or being sued may be jurors, if other-
wise competent and qualified.
Ch. 495-JURIES IN CLASS Two COUNTIES (BUCHANAN, CLAY, GREEN AND
JASPER COUNTIES)
495.131 RSMo 1959-General provisions as to disqualification and
exemption apply.
The provisions of sections 494.010, 494.020, 494.031 and 494.040,
RSMo, relating to the qualifications and disqualifications of, jurors
and exemptions for service as a juror, shall be applicable to jurors
drawn and selected under the provisions of this chapter.
(Vol. 33
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495.170 RSMo 1959-Term of service.
No petit juror shall be compelled to serve on such jury ior more than
two weeks consecutively during any term of court; provided, that in
no case shall this section cause the discharge of an juror during the
actual pendency of the trial of any cause. (emphasis added.)
Ch. 496-JURIES IN COUNTIES OF 700,000 INHABITANTS (ST. Louis COUNTY)
(Supp. 1967)
496.101 RSMo 1959-General provisions as to disqualification and
exemption apply.
(Same-text as § 495.131 supra.)
496.130 RSMo 1959-Petit juror-length of service.
No petit juror shall be permitted to serve on such jury for more than
one consecutive week during any term of court; provided, that in no
case shall this section cause the discharge of any juror during the
actual pendency of the trial of any cause. (emphasis added.),
Ch. 497-JURIES IN COUNTIES OF 450,000 TO 700,000 INHABITANTS (JAcK-
SON COUNTY) (Supp. 1967)
497.130 RSMo (Supp. 1967)-List of jurors, selection, data processing
equipment authorized-questionnaire--(etc.)
(Extensive questionnaire procedures to determine qualifications in
accordance with sections 494.010 and .020, supra, and .031, sum-
marized in note 34, infra.)
497.201 RSMo 1959-General provisions as to disqualification and
exemption apply.
(Same text as § 495.131 supra.)
497.250 RSMo 1959-Consecutive time petit juror may serve.
(Same text as § 496.130 supra.)
Ch. 498-JURIES IN CITIES OF MORE THAN 500,000 INHABITANTS (CITY
OF ST. Louis)
498.120 RSMo (Supp. 1967)-General provisions as to disqualification
and exemption-determination of qualifications.
1. (Same text as § 495.131 supra.)
2. (Prospective juror shall establish exemptions.)
3. The jury commissioner and each deputy shall diligently inquire
and inform himself, by all lawful means, of the qualifications of
residents in the city who may be liable to be summoned for jury
duty.
4. Each court of record in the city shall excuse from service as a
juror every person who, being examined upon the voir dire, appears
to the court to be a person not qualified for jury service.
498.130 RSMo 1959-Examination of prospective jurors-penalties.
(Examinations for juror qualification to be under oath, by prospec-
tive jurors and others; contempt penalties for refusals to be exam-
ined; misdemeanor penalties for "whoever shall willfully or corruptly
make and swear to any false answers to questions put to him by said
jury commissioner or any of such deputies . . .)
498.140 RSMo 1959-Exemptions claimed and proved, how.
(Prospective juror shall establish exemptions.)
498.270 RSMo 1959-Required to serve but once in each year.
No person shall be required to serve as a juror, either grand or petit,
more than once in any period of twelve months, from the time of his
previous service. (emphasis added.)
Ch. 499-MAGISTRATE COURT JURIES
499.015 RSMo 1959-General provisions as to disqualification and exemp-
tion apply.
(Same text as § 495.131 supra.)
Cf., challenges for cause under Missouri's statutory provisions, briefly
identified, and partially quoted, partially summarized, are as follows:
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chalIugb n'clud formal juror qualificatiori and personal capacityiin both physical
and' merikal sens&S.3 4 Generally, these grounds were waivable at common law and
Ch. 494---GENERAL PROVISIONS AS TO JURIES
Section 494.190 RSMo 1959-Challenges for cause in civil cases, grounds
of.
No witness or person summoned as a witness in any civil cause, and
no person who has formed or expressed an opinion concerning the
matter, or any material fact in controversy in any such cause,-whifh
may influence the judgment of such person, or who is of kin to either
,party to any such cause within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, shall be sworn as a juror in the same cause.
Ch. 495-JURIES IN CLASS Two COUNTIES (BUCHANAN, CLAY, GREEN AND
JASPER COUNTIES)
495.140 RSMo (Supp. 1967)-Challenges.
Any person may challenge any juror for cause, for any reason men-
tioned in sections 494.010 and 494.020 RSMo, and for any other
causes authorized by the laws of the state. (Note: this would include
the "com'rwn law" of the state.)
.495.150 RSMo 1959-Right to challenge upon the voir dire.
If upon the voir dire it appears that any juror is in the employ of
any person, firm, or corporation who has within the six months last
past employed, or who within such time has had in his or its employ,
any attorney on either side of the case being tried, the opposing
party shall have the right to challenge such juror for cause.
Ch. 496-JURIES IN COUNTIES OF 700,000 INHABITANTS (ST. Louis COUNTY)
(Supp. 1967)
496.110 RSMo (Supp. 1967)-Challenging of juror.
Any party may challenge any juror for cause, for any reason men-
tioned in sections 494.010 and 494.020, RSMo, and for any other causes
authorized by the laws of the state. (Note: Only parties uray challenge
in St. Louis County, whereas any person can challenge in class two
counties. Section 495.140 RSMo (Supp. 1967) supra.)
Ch. 497-JURIES IN COUNTIES OF 450,000 TO 700,000 INHABITANTS (JACK-
SON CoUmT) (Supp. 1967)
497.210 RSMo (Supp. 1967)-Challenge for cause.
(Same text as § 496.110 supra, with minor variations.)
Ch. 499-MAGISTRATE COURT JURIES
499.080 RSMo 1959-Challenging of jurors.
Any juror may be challenged in any case on the ground that he is of
kin to either party, or that he has an interest in the suit, or that he
has formed or expressed an opinion in the case and if the magistrate
shall find that such ground exists he shall disqualify the juror from
sitting in the case.
As can readily be seen, Missouri's statutory provisions for juror challenges are a
crazy-quilt of inconsistency.
34. See Missouri's statutory sections cited in the preceding footnote. In
addition, grounds for excuse from jury duty on request of the prospective juror
are provided in § 494.031 RSMo (1959): (1) Over age sixty-five; (2) Any
woman (See also, Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22(b)); (3) Practicing doctors and den-
tists; (4) Clergymen; (5) Professors or teachers; (6) Anyone having had jury
duty within one year (Cf., §§ 495.170, 496.130, 497.250, 498.270 (same), set forth
in note 33 supra); (7) Governmental employees, in any of the three branches of
government, when actively engaged in their duties; (8) Where absence from em-
ployment would, in the court's judgment, affect public safety, health, welfare or
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are now waived. by statute if, not discovered and asserted before impaneling of the
jury3 . or rendering of their verdictU. They are almost never groupds fQr a new
trial. 7 The problem presented in Edgar can be classified as defining a narrow
portion of the line between pro pter affectum or constittitional juror challenges and
propter defect rm or non-constitutional juror challenges. As will be shown, failure
to observe these common law distinctions in cases close to the constitutional limits
for juror challenges can create a good deal of confusion.
Missouri's 1945 constitutional provisions concerning juror qugTification pre-
serve jury trial rights "heretofore enjoyed" 38 and prescribe that "three-fourths of
the members" of the jury concurring mayr render a [civil] verdict" 3 9 They also
provide that no person shall be disqualified for jury duty by reason of his religious
beliefs so long as the exercise of those beliefs does not limit the rights of others. 40
Such rights of others would include the right to trial by jury. Since the rights
"heretofore enjoyed" on adoption of the 1945 constitution included then existing
implementing statutes4' and interpretative cases,42 it is clear: "The right to a fair
and impartial jury is guaranteed by the Constitution,"43 and "the means and
method of enjoyment of that right are left to the reasonable exercise 'bf legislative
discretion."" Also, "even though three-fourths of them can decide 'a 'civil case,
parties are entitled to have that decision, whether for them or against them, based
on the honest deliberations of twelve qualified men.145 Therefore, applying to the
facts of Edgar either the rights "heretofore enjoyed" or the express "constitutional
35. E.g., Section 494.050 RSMo (1959): "No exception to a jurdf on account
of his citizefiship, nonresidence, state or age or other legal disability shall be
allowed after the jury is sworn." '
36. E.g., Okershauser v. State, 136 Wis. 111, 116 N.W. 769 (1908) (statute
requiring, objection before return of verdict).
37. See Annot. 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 933, 946-949 (1914).
38. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 22(a).
39. Ibid.
40. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 5: "No person shall, on account of' his religious
persuasion or belief ... be disqualified from testifying or serving as a juror ... ;
But, this section shall not be construed to ...justify practices inconsistent with
the good order, peace or safety of the state, or with the rights of others."
41. Mo.. CoNsT. (1945), Schedule, § 2.
42. See In re Mognihan, 332 Mo. 1022, 1029-1031, 62 S.W.2d 410, 413-414
(1933), and cases cited therein.
43. E.g., Privitt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 300 S.W. 726, 728 (MO.
1927); Moore v. Middlewest Freightways, Inc., 266 S.W.2d 578, 586 (Mo. 1954).
44. E.g., Privitt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., supra note 43. Thus,
common law regarding juror competency challenges would seem to govern except
to the extent codified or changed by legislative discretion. Accordingly, e.g., the
previous text discussion of peremptory challenge cases (see text at and note 15
supra) indicates the right to exercise such challenges is constitutional as a com-
mon law right "heretofore enjoyed," although the existence or number of peremptory
challenges may be set by statute. See § 494.200 RSMo (1959) (civil-three);
§ 546.180 RSMo (1959) (criminal-variable from three to twenty, depending upon
the offense charged and population of the court's jurisdiction).
45, .R.g., Piehler v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 357 Mo. 866, 873, 211 S.W.2d
459, 463 (1948), quoting Lee v. Baltimore Hotel Co., 345 Mo. 458, 463-464, 136
S.W.2d 695, 698 (1939).
1968].::
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provisions on jury trial and religious freedom rights, the decision's result was
proper 4 6
There are few reported cases drawing the constitutional/non-constitutional line
for juror challenge on the ground of actual deliberative inactivity. In fames v.
Ross,47 a Tennessee apjellate court was able to side-step the issue since the facts
could be categorized as improper activity "at the beginning of the jury's delibera-
tions and before any vote was taken . . . .- 48 One juror left her seat at the table,
went to a closed window in the jury room, and called and waved through it toward
a person whom she mistakenly believed to be her husband whom she expected to
join after her duties had been completed. She also enlisted the aid of another juror
to help watch at the window for her husband. Since (1) "three ballots were taken
before the jury reached its verdict,"49 (2) no actual non-participation had been
shown, and (3) the offered juror testimony was inadmissible as directed only to
improper juror activity, a presumption arose in favor of the verdict's propriety.
This presumption was not overcome. 0 In another Tennessee case, Green v. State,51
non-participation in the deliberations was not reached, but necessarily would have
resulted. An impaneled juror confessed an inability to render a criminal verdict due
to religious convictions. 52 Excuse of this juror left but eleven impaneled jurors and
a mistrial resulted. The issue before the court was, therefore, double jeopardy
through requiring the accused's retrial. The trial court's decision to excuse the
juror necessarily must have been based on the premise that juror non-participation
in deliberations would have been a disqualification at the constitutional level.
Therefore, in affirming that no double jeopardy resulted, the state supreme court
expressly approved the trial court's excuse of the juror on this non-participation
ground. 3 The Kansas case of State v. Hansford,54 where a juror confessed in-
46. The legislature having not provided for non-participation in deliberations,
constitutional tests as announced by the cases were applicable. Text at and notes
43, 44 and 45 supra. Also, the constitution having expressly provided for primacy
of the jury trial rights over religious freedom rights, in the circumstances presented
in Edgar, the constitution must govern. Note 40 spra. Interestingly, the consti-
tutional juror disqualification for religious views interfering with jury trial rights
was clearly present in Edgar, but apparently not raised by the parties and therefore
not discussed by the court. Also, voir dire inquiry into prospective juror religious
affiliation is usually denied unless there is a proper ground to do so. E.g., Rose v.
Sheedy, 345 Mo. 610, 134 S.W.2d 18 (1939). Therefore, on the basis of the Edgar
and Rosg cases, it would appear that in Missouri particular inquiry might now
be allowed, if it is directed toward avoiding religious non-participation and an
invalid verdict.
47. 51 Tenn.App. 413, 369 S.W.2d 1 (1962), cert. denied (Tenn. 1963).
48. Id., at 421, 369 S.W.2d at 5.
49. Ibid.
50. Id., at 421-422, 369 S.W.2d at 5.
51. 147 Tenn. 299, 247 S.W. 84 (1923), annotated 28 A.L.R. 849 (1924). See
also, Annot. 33 A.L.R. 142 (1924).
52. Id., at 302-303, 247 S.W. at 84-85.
53. Id., at 312-313, 247 S.W. at 88.
54. 76 Kan. 678, 92 Pac. 551 (1907).
502. [Vol, 33
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ability to render a verdict after substantial evidence had been introduced,55 is
quite similar.56
The extent of the juror disqualification for inactivity is not clear. In the words
of the Edgar court: "Implicit in 'trial' by twelve impartial .qualified persons is the
concept that there be consideration of the issues and the evidence and deliberation
thereon upon the part of all twelve . . . ,,17 This seems to paint with too broad a
brush. The juror inactivity disqualification does not include non-volitional activity,,
such as where the jurors' decision is the result of duress or coercion.tu Only -volun-
tary inactivity was involved-both in Edgar and in the double jeopardy cases
outlined above. Also, it would seem that the related class of cases involving "going
along" with the verdict agreed upon by the remainder of the jury, and the like,
would not be included. 59 Improper activity-"going along"--would not be com-
plete inactivity.
Missouri decisions where grounds for challenge are not disclosed because of
false voir dire answers present similar fine line distinctions. They seem to fall
both within and without the modem "bias or prejudice" contraction of the broader
propter affectum challenge category of the common law. Those cases involving
failure to disclose direct bias or prejudice for or against either of the parties clearly
involve constitutional challenges. 60 However, cases closer to the modern line
present rationalizing difficulties. Lee v. Baltimore Hotel Co.61 involved an
imposter juror. The court seemed to view this situation as within the bias challenge
on the common law ground of "suspicion of partiality." 62 It said, "A man who
uses dishonest means to get on a jury, does not usually do so for the purpose of
honestly deciding the case .... "63 The opinion contains no recitation of dishonest
motive. The next step was the Edgar decision. Juror non-participation, without
more, cannot be said to raise even a shadow of partiality. Therefore, it would
seem more appropriate to consider both the Lee and Edgar situations as within
a broader, more direct constitutional challenge category. Why try to fit Lee and
Edgar within an artificial extension of a "bias or prejudice" category when the
very terms of the common law classifications indicate a clearer distinction? There
seems no question but that imposter and non-participating jurors defeat the right
55. Id., at 679, 92 Pac. at 551-552.
56. See also, Annot. of State v. Hansford, 76 Kan. 678, 92 Pac. 551 (1907),
on double jeopardy due juror excuse after impanelment, 14 L.R.A.(N.S.) 548(1908).57.' City of Flat River v. Edgar, 412 S.W.2d 537, 539 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967).
58. E.g., State v. Bersch, 276 Mo. 397, 207 S.W. 809 (1918); Wilkins v.
Abbey,-168 Misc. 416, 5 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1938); Annot. 19 A.L.R.2d 1257 (1951).
59. See, e.g., Annots. 73 A.L.R. 93 (1931) (majority verdicts), 52 A.L.R. 41
(1928) (quotient verdicts).
60. See cases cited in note 30 supra.
61. 345 Mo. 458, 126 S.W.2d 695 (1939).
62. State v. Levy, 187 N.C. 581, 585, 122 S.E. 386, 388-389 (1924): "propter
affectum, on account of bias, suspicion or [sic] partiality, prejudice, or the
like . . ." (Quoted from among the four common law challenge grounds quoted
in full in note 19 supra.)
63. Lee v. Baltimore Hotel Co., 345 Mo. 458, 464, 136 S.W.2d 695, 698
(1939).
1968 1 ., 501..-
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to have a.fair and impartial jury.-Therefore, propter affectum indicate& a.challenge
basically affecting the juror's ability to fairly and impartially decide; whereas
propter defectum indicates a lesser defect in the juror's qualifcations. Piecemeal
attempts to codify the common law seem to have led us astray. .
Possibly closer to the foregoing analysis than would first appear isjhe proposi-
tion in Edgar that silence (inactivity) in response to a direct voir dire question is
effective as an implied answer.6 4 While silence is often considered either wholly
ineffective0 5 or ambiguous60 as an answer, when the question or statement clearly
requires an affirmative response, silence can be an unequivocal answer. This has
long been the rule for voir dire examination.67 Therefore, when silence collcurs with
an actual lack of juror qualifications, a misrepresentation of such qualifications may
exist.08
The importance of such a potential misrepresentation becomes apparent when
we consider the delicate task of avoiding waiver of grounds for a juror challenge.
Reasonable pre-trial investigation of the panel,69 very precisely worded voir dire
questions, 70 and timely assertion of discovered challenges7l are important to preserve
errors for constitutional challenge grounds. These same procedures ar6 essehtial in
asserting non-constitutional juror challenges 72 Non-constitutional challenges must
64. City of Flat River v. Edgar, 412 S.W.2d 537, 539-540 (St. L. -Mo. App.
1967).
65. See SIMPSON, LAw OF CONTRACTs § 40 (2d ed. 1965); But see §
400.2-207(2) RSMo (Supp. 1967).
66. E.g., silence as an admission of party opponent-MoRGAN, BAsIc, PROB-
LEMS OF EVIDENCE 270 (Mo. Bar spec. ed. 1961) and LAUER, SPECIAL MIssoURI
PocKET PART thereto, at 88-89.
67. E.g., City of Flat River v. Edgar, 412 S.W.2d 537, 539 (St. L. Mo. App.
1967); Sadlon v. Richardson, 382 S.W.2d 9 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964); Moore v.
Middlewest Freightways, Inc., 266 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. 1954). Cf., State v. Crawford,
416 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1967) (question on voir dire too loose; non-constitutional
challenge ground lost).
68. E.g., City of Flat River v. Edgar, 412 S.W.2d 537 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967);
Lee v. Baltimore Hotel Co., 345 Mo. 458, 136 S.W.2d 695 (1939). Note, this
rationale does not require intent to not participate, or to participate -wrongfully,
at the time of the silence-a prerequisite for misrepresentation per se-which was
recognized but skipped over by the Edgar court. City of Flat River v. Edgar,
supra at 539-540.
69. E.g., Harrington v. Manchester & L. R.R. Co., 62 N.H. 77 (1882) (de-
fendant's failure to discover share holder status of juror was lack of diligence);
Ex Parte Sullivan, 155 Fla. 111, 19 So.2d 611 (1944) (undiscovered deputy sheriff
on panel; matter of public record). Cf., Gaff v. State, 155 Ind. 277, 58 N.E. 74
(1900) (two jurors were deputy sheriffs; objection to remote to be anticipated,
so no waiver).
70. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 7 Cal.App.2d 271, 46 P.2d 232 (1935) (otherwise
excludable religious belief voir dire properly specified to bias ground); Cf., State v.
Crawford, 416 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1967) (question not designed to uncover par-
ticular disqualification).
71. E.g., Harding v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 27 S.W.2d 778 (St. L. Mo. App.
1930) (attorney's inattention failed to catch truthful voir dire challenge cause;
held-waiver).
72. E.g., State v. Crawford, 416 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1967) (attorney in panel
would have been disqualified under § 494.020(4), but only if discovered beforejury sworn, due statutory waiver of § 494.050 RSMo); State v. Barr, 223 Mo.App.
766, 20 S.W.2d 599 (St. L. Ct. App. 1929) (similar, undiscovered juror minority).
[vol.-3-:3
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be discovered and asserted, during voir dire, or', at. the latest,, before impanelment
of the 'jury or before the jurors' verdict, depending upon the 'jurisdiction's, fule"
However, failure to disclose non-constitutionial grounds in response to -precisely.
worded voir- dire. questions may sometimes raise, non-constitutional challenges to
a constitutional level;74 i.e., by creating a clear misrepresentation of-juror qualifica-
tions which goes to the fairness and impartiality of the jury. Therefore, as in Edgar,.
the question which requires a positive answer for disclosure of challenge grounds is
most useful. If cause is disclosed, it must be handled promptly. 5 If such cause. at
the constitufional level remains undisclosed, reasonably complete voir dire question
coverage will- meet the requirement of due diligence, which, together with. the fact
of non-disdlosure, preserves the possibility of procuring a new trial 6 If a non-
constitutional cause remains undisclosed after precise voir dire, this may amount
to a misrepresentation sufficient to require a new trial.77
Harmless error is not cause for a new trial; the moving or appealing party
must be prejudiced if he is to obtain relief. 8 It is here that the trial couri's discre -
tion in granting a new trial, if applicable, is most important; 79 and, with an appeal,
only abuse of discretion by the trial court can give reversal.O Whether the ground
for challenge of the juror for cause is constitutional or non-constitutional is often
determinative. If constitutional, a new trial is almost universally required (absent
lack of diligence by the moving or appealing party) since both a constitutional
cause and per se prejudice exist, due to the interaction of such challenges and
peremptory challenges, and the trial court's discretionary area is closely circum-
scribed. 8' By comparison, non-constitutional causes for juror challenge usually are
not grounds for a new trial at either the trial court or appellate levels.82 Only in
73. See text at and notes 35 and 36 supra.
74. See cases cited note 72 supra.
75. E.g., Harding v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 27 S.W.2d 778 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930).
76. E.g., Piehler v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 357 Mo. 866, 211 S.W.2d 459(1948); Gibney v. St. Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 704, 103 S.W. 43 (1907).
77. I.e., Lee v. Baltimore Hotel Co., 345 Mo. 458, 136 S.W.2d 695 (1939).
78. Prejudice and presence of a constitutionally disqualified juror appear
equated in Missouri cases. Moore v. Middlewest Freightways, Inc., 266 S.W.2d
578 (Mo. 1954) (constitutional inter-relationship of peremptory and for cause
challenges). This is not necessarily the case in other states; some find constitutional
causes per se, with or without proved prejudice, and others may find waiver for
even pro pter affectum (usually constitutional) causes. See Annot. 50 L.R.A.(N.S.)
933, 941-946 (1914). However, whether voir dire answers were in fact truthful or
were intentional concealment is a matter of discretionary decision. Sadlon v.
Richardson, 382 S.W.2d 9 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964); Triplett v. St. Louis Pub. Serv.
Co., 343- S.W.2d 670 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961). Therefore, existence of prejudice
may lie in the court's discretionary finding on the underlying matter.
79. E.g., Reich v. Thompson, 346 Mo. 577, 142 S.W.2d 486 (1940).
80. Ibid.
81. E.g., Piehler v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 357 Mo. 866, 211 S.W.2d 459(1948). See also, notes 16 and 44 supra (peremptory challenges) and note 78
supra" (discreionary area).
82. ' Missouri has long had a statutory bar for lack of challenge before thejury is sworn. Sedion -494.050 RSMo (1959). Common law decisions in other states
are summarized in Annot. 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 933, 941-946 (1914).
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rare instances have multiple non-constitutional grounds been held to so cloud the
fairness and impartiality of the verdict that the trial court has been persuaded to
grant a new trial,8 3 However, if the failure to discover such non-constitutional
grounds is due to non-disclosure on direct and precise voir dire questioning, eyen
non-constitutional grounds for juror challenge may be raised to a constitutional
level as a species of misrepresentation.84 Such misrepresentations may be considered
to affect the juror's capacity to render a fair and impartial verdict, depending upon
the particular situation.8 5
In addition to the "remedy" of a new trial, it appears that alternative and
possibly additional remedies either are or ought to be available. For criminal cases,
the state can bring criminal charges against jurors who willfully obstruct justice by
causing constitutional challenge grounds to subsist.8 6 Such criminal charges are in
addition to the right, residing in the trial judge, to police the judicial process with
appropriate contempt proceedings.8 7 It also appears that a criminal prosecution
could be initiated by the aggrieved party in a civil suit through complaint to the
prosecuting attorney.88 However, no cases have been found where an aggrieved
party has attempted a civil claim. Sounding in tort,8 9 such a claim would be for
the expenses or other prejudice to such party resulting from being required to
present his case in the invalid trial. It would seem that where the non-disclosure is
willful, recovery of at least the costs and attorney's fees for the invalidated trial
ought to be possible in a civil suit brought jointly by both parties to the invalid
trial. 0
In summary, many decisions involving impropriety in juror deliberations tend
to confuse juror "competency" to testify concerning improprieties with juror dis-
qualification for lack of "competency" to so act. While authorities are split on
admissibility of testimony concerning improper juror activity in arriving at their
verdict, 01 improprieties in juror qualifications can be the basis for a new trial. In
83. E.g., Cameron v. Ottawa Electric Ry. Co., 32 Ont. 24 (1900) (One jury-
man summoned for and served on panel by mistake; another deaf; third a former
shareholder and connected by affinity to secretary of defendant).
84. E.g., Lee v. Baltimore Hotel Co., 345 Mo. 458, 136 S.W.2d 695 (1939).
85. Ibid.
86. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932) (criminal contempt); State v.
Serpas, 188 La. 1074, 179 So. 1 (1938) (perjury prosecution).
87. Murphy v. Wright, 167 Iowa 75, 148 N.W. 985 (1914); Witte Hard-
ware Co. v. McElhinney, 231 Mo.App. 860, 100 S.W.2d 36 (St. L. Ct. App. 1937)
(dicta); Lightfoot v. Kurn, 164 S.W.2d 77 (Spr. Mo. App. 1942) (dicta). Sec-
tions 476.110-.160 RSMo (1959). Note, however, contempt proceedings may not
be used to enforce any civil right or remedy. Section 476.150 RSMo (1959). See
Annot. 32 A.L.R. 436 (1924).
88. Sections 545.010 (any felony by indictment or information), 557.010-.030
(perjury) RSMo (1959).
89. See § 537.050 RSMo (1959).
90. It is a salutary rule that the processes by which jurors arrive at their
verdicts ought not to be subject to potential post-trial contempt or testimonial
pressures. But, it by no means follows that jurors should be exempt or privileged as
to either the state or private parties when their willful activity is in direct deroga-
tion of the judicial process. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1932).
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such cases, juror testimony is clearly allowed to establish the existence of at least
constitutional juror challenge grounds. Although the line is far from clear, complete
juror inactivity in the jury's deliberations allows constitutional challenge of the
jury's verdict; while partial inactivity probably is not of a constitutional level, but
mere impropriety in the jury's processes. If the existence of a ground for constitu-
tional challenge is not discovered by voir dire examination, the party aggrieved must
show reasonable diligence in attempting to discover it or that it was not reasonable
to anticipate such a challenge ground. Since the exercise of peremptory challenges
is impaired when constitutional level challenges for cause are either undisclosed or
overruled, this furnishes prejudice; but, finding sufficient prejudice with non-
constitutional challenges is discretionary with the court. Reasonable diligence re-
quires appropriate pre-trial investigation of the jury panel, carefully worded voir
dire questions, and prompt motions for disqualification whenever any ground
for juror challenge is discovered. If the grounds are of a constitutional level, they
may be asserted successfully even after judgment. Non-constitutional juror chal-
lenges can be asserted only before empanelment of the jury,92 except in rare in-
stances where the trial court may exercise its discretion. Discretionary situations
arise Where either serious multiple grounds or juror misrepresentations have de-
stroyed the right to a fair and impartial trial.
RicHARD N. BROWN
USE OF WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES AS AN AID IN
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS
United States v. McWkirter'
The federal government obtained a default judgment against the appellees on
a promissory note in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
After unsuccessfully attempting to collect on its judgment, the government served
written interrogatories on the appellees. The purpose of these interrogatories was
the discovery of some assets which the government could levy upon to satisfy its
judgment. Appellees failed to answer, and the government moved for an order
compelling appellees to answer the written interrogatories. This motion was denied
by the district court on the ground that rule 69(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedures only allowed the taking of depositions and did not include the right to
propound written interrogatories. The government appealed this decision, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the
district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. This note concerns
92. Section 494.050 RSMo (1959). Cf., some states allow juror challenge at
any time before the verdict is returned. Okershauser v. State, 136 Wis. 111, 116
N.W. 769 (1908):
1. United States v. McWhirter, 376 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1967).
1968]-
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the -appellate court's ruling that rule .69(a>2 authorizes the propounding of written
interrogatories pursuant to rule 33 of, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure..-
, Rule' 69(a) provides fdr the examination of any person, by the judgment
creditor 6r his successor in interest, when that interest appears of record, in aid of
a- judgment or. execution in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of -Civil
Procedure for taking depositions or in the manner provided by the practice' of the
state where the district court is held. There is no express reference' made to the
serving of written interrogatories by the judgment creditor. However, it is-the view
of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that the. term "depositions" as used
in rule 69(a) refers to all the discovery procedures available under rules' 26 to. 33
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,3
To decide what the term "depositions",means as used in rule 69(a), the intent
of, the framers of the rule should be considered. Major Tolman, secretary to the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules stated that:
Rule' 69 deals with execution. it follows the present practice aid pre-
serves existing statutes. It also'allows the deposition rules (rules 26 to 33)
to be used in proceedings supplementary to execution. Hearings Before
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Congress 3rd Sess., Ser. 17,
,.p. 126 (1938). 4
This statement indicates that the framers of rule 69, while using only the word
depositions, meant to include all the discovery devices provided for in rules 26
to 33. This position is supported by the decision in Monticello Tobacco Co., Inc.
v. American Tobacco Co., which held that "the nature of the proceeding requires
a broad, rather than a restricted, examination." 5
The court of appeals accepted Professor Moore's view on the interpretation to
be given rule 69(a). Moore points out that "the primary purpose of Rules 26-37
is to obtain discovery prior to trial. The purpose of rule 69(a) is to adapt their
procedure to post-judgment discovery.. . And while use of the word 'depositions'
in rule 69(a) may seem narrow . . . the general purpose of the 'rule is ap-
parent .. -,
In the Lowenstein case cited by the court of appeals in the instant decision,
a district court held that rule 34 was not included in the post-judgment discovery
2. The pertinent portion of the rule is as follows: "The procedure on execu-
tion, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceedings
on and in aid of execution shall be in accordance with the practice- and 'procedure
of the state in which the district court is held, existing at the timethe remedy is
sought, except that any statute of the United States governs to the extent that it
is applicable. In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or his
successor in interest when that interest appears of record, may examine any -person,
including the judgment debtor, in the manner provided in these rules for taking
depositions or in the manner provided by the practice of the state in which the
district court is held." FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a).
3. United States v. McWhirter, 376 F.2d 102, 106 (5th ,Cir. 1967).
,4. United States v. McWhirter, supra note 3.
5. Monticello Tobacco Co., Inc. v. American Tobacco Co., I9,7 F.2d,',629
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
6. 7 MooaE, FEDERAL PRACricE § 69.05(1) n.10 (2d ed. 1964).'
[V..::-3,3
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devices available-under rule 69(a).7 In-holding that production of documents under
rule 34 was not covered by the provisions- of rule 69(a) for examination of any
persorr, .that court confined its ruling to a consideration of rule 34, and did not
decide or -give an opinion as to which of the rules of discovery might be encom-
passed.-by rule 69(a). s The Lowenstein case thus can be distinguished from the
instant situation.
The trial court, in denying the government's motion to compel the appellees to
answer the'written interrogatories, 9 agreed with a statement found in Barron &
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure.'0 There it is stated that "the matter is
one for amendment of the rule, rather than distortion of the existing language."
The matter referred to however, was not the use of rule 33 interrogatories, but was
the use of rule 34 procedure for the production of documents. While trying to fit
rule 34 info the language of rule 69 requires more than a little distortion of the
existing language, this is not true of rule 33 interrogatories. The subject to be
examined (any person) is the same under rule 33 as under rule 26. Rule 34, on
the other hand, deals with production of documents for inspection and copying,
which .contain- or constitute evidence of matters within the scope of examination
of rule 26(b). The key words of rule 69(a) which exclude use of rule 34 procedure
but include rule 33 procedure are "any person." Rule 34 deals with documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things only, whereas
rule 33' dears with persons, as does rule 26. By including the procedure of rule 33
in those available under rule 69 the court here did not expand the area into which
the judgment creditor could inquire. The court has only given the judgment
creditor an alternative method of asking the same questions that could be -asked
during the taking of a deposition. Post-judgment procedure is now as flexible as is
the procedure for pre-trial discovery. The judgment creditor can examine the
judgment debtor in the way he feels is best suited for his situation.
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, on November 30, 1967, submitted
to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, a draft of proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. One such amendment would change the present rule 69(a) to read
as follows:
Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ
of execution, unless the court directs otherwise. The procedure on execu-
tion, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of a judgment, and
in aid-of execution shall be in accordance with the practice and procedure
of the state in which the district court is held, existing at the time the
remedy is sought, except that any statute of the United States governs
- to the extent that it is applicable. In aid of the judgment or execution,
7. M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. American Underwear Mfg. Co., 11 F.R.D.
172 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
8. M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc. v. American Underwear Mfg. Co., supra note
7.
9. United States v. McWhirter, 376 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1967).
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the judgment creditor or his successor in interest when that, interest ap
pears of record, may obtain discovery from any person, including the judg-
ment debtor, in the manner provided in these rules or in the manner
provided by the practice of the state in which the district court is held.11
"The Amendment assures that, in aid of execution or a judgment, all discovery
procedures provided in the rules are available and not just discovery via the
taking of a deposition.' u 2 Adoption of this change would be an affirmation of the
instant decision, but rejection of the amendment would not mean that the decision
is incorrect. By holding that rule 69(a), as it now reads, includes rule 33 pro-
cedures and excludes rule 34 procedure, the court stops short of changing the
scope of rule 69(a), an act proper only for the Supreme Court by amendment of
the rule, and merely clarifies the existing language of that rule.
After deciding that rule 69(a) does include the rule 33 written interrogatory
procedure as an aid in execution of judgment, the court in McWhirter states that
the same result can be reached under that part of rule 69(a) which allows the
judgment creditor, at his election, to follow the existing state discovery practice
provided for post-judgment discovery. The language of the applicable Texas rule,13
like that of rule 69, does not expressly provide for the use of written interrogatories.
The Texas courts, however, have held that:
It is our view that the first two sentences of Rule 737, which are the
same as old Article 2002, should be given the same construction that the
Supreme Court of Texas has heretofore given the same and that under that
portion of Rule 737 written interrogatories are authorized in discovery
suits. 1
4
The court of appeals could have reached the same result by relying wholly
on the application of state procedure to this situation as is permitted by rule
69(a). The fact that they chose to base their decison primarily on the inclusion
of rule 33 procedure by rule 69(a) is of importance to lawyers in states such as
Missouri where the post-judgment discovery procedure does not include the right
to propound written interrogatories to the judgment debtor. The practical effect
of this decision will be to allow judgment creditors more flexibility in post-judgment
discovery situations.
Support for this result is found in rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure which states that "they shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and
11. 43 F.R.D. 211, 273 (1968).
12. Ibid.
13. Tix. R. CIv. P. 737. The pertinent portion of the rule is as follows: "All
trial courts shall entertain suits in the nature of bills of discovery, and grant relief
therein in accordance with the usages of courts of equity. Such remedy shall be
cumulative of all other remedies. In actions of such nature, the plaintiff shall have
the right to have the defendant examined on oral interrogatories, either by sum-
moning him to appear for examination before the trial court as in ordinary trials,
or by taking his oral deposition in accordance with the general rules relating
thereto."
14. Roy Mitchell Contracting Co. v. Mueller Co., 326 S.W.2d 522, 524-25
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
[WoL 33
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inexpensive determination of every action." There is no prior case law in conflict
or agreement with this decision. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
thus decided a case of first impression which should be followed by all federal
courts because of the sound logic used to reach the decision given and the benefits
which will result therefrom.
By placing this interpretation on rule 69 this court is following the intent
of the authors of the rule. Judgment debtors are thereby subjected to no new areas
of inquiry and judgment creditors holding small judgments are given more flexibility
in gaining information needed to obtain payment of their judgments.
HENRY S. CLAPPER
USE OF MULTIPLE PLEAS AS ADMISSIONS
Mackeca v. Fowlerl
In August, 1962, four vehicles heading east in morning rush hour traffic were
involved in an accident. The first three cars came to a stop, but the fourth car,
driven by Fowler, collided with the rear of the third car, knocking it into the
second car, which then struck the first car. Macheca, the driver of the third car,
suffered personal injuries and filed suits against the drivers of the other three
cars.
2
Macheca's claims against the drivers of cars number one and number two were
subsequently dismissed on motions for summary judgment. Macheca then pro-
ceeded to trial against Fowler, the driver of car number four. During the course of
the trial Fowler introduced into evidence certain allegations of plaintiff's petition
against the drivers of cars number one and two which alleged that these drivers
were guilty of negligence. Fowler, the remaining defendant, contended that these
allegations that the drivers of cars number one and two were the parties at fault
constituted an admission by Macheca that they caused the accident. Macheca
testified at trial that Fowler's failure to stop was the cause.3 Fowler offered these
portions of the petition to impeach the testimony of Macheca. The trial court
allowed them to be used in this manner. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
found for the defendant.4
A subsequent motion for a new trial was sustained because of the alleged error
in allowing the portion of plaintiff's petition filed against the drivers of cars
number one and two to be introduced into evidence and allowing arguments based
on the alleged admissions contained in these pleadings. Motions for a new trial
1. 412 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. 1967).
2. Id. at 463.
3. Id. at 463-464.
4. Id. at 463-464.
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were also sustained because of other alleged errors.5 Fowler appealed the granting
of the new trial to the Missouri Supreme Court.6
On appeal, the supremd court sustained the order for a new trial and remanded
the case. The" basis for the decision was a general rule7 recognized in Missouri,
"that in cases involving 'multiple pleas, a pleading on one issue may not be used
as an admission' upon another issue in the same case." s The court believed the
injection of the dismissed pleadings into evidence tended to confuse the issues and
that this error was justification for the ordering of a new trial.9
When discussing admissions, it should be remembered they can serve two
functions in a law suit. First, they constitute substantive and probative evidence
on the facts contained within the admission. Second, they serve an impeaching
function, if the admission is inconsistent with testimony given by the party against
whom it is offered.10 The Missouri courts, although never discussing these two
functions of an admission within the same decision, has at various times in separate
decisions recognized that an admission does serve both functions."
Furthermore, it should be recognized there is only one requirement which a
statement must meet to qualify as an admission. According to Professor Wigmore,
the statement must be offered against the party making the statement by his party
opponent.12 There is no requirement that the admission be "against the interest"
of the party making the statement.13 Even though the Missouri courts have con-
sistently spoken of these statements as admissions against interest, there appears
to be no decision where the admission has been excluded because it was self-serving
rather than against interest.14
The use of pleadings as admissions varies. In Missouri, pleadings filed in other
actions, pleadings withdrawn, superceded, or abandoned, and statements of fact
contained within the pleadings of the case being tried can be introduced into
S. Id. at 463. "The trial court also sustained the motion for new trial on the
grounds that it erred in permitting the defendant to show that, although plaintiff
ad deleted any claim for lost wages from his petition prior to trial, plaintiff
originally claimed a loss in weekly wages of $1,000.00. The court also sustained the
allegation of error ,in permitting argument on the basis of the original claim of lost
wages."
6. Id. at 463.
7. Wigmore states the rule is accepted in all jurisdictions. 4 WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE § 1064, pp. 48-49 (3rd Ed. 1940).
8. Macheca v. Fowler, 412 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Mo. 1967).
9. Id. at 466.
10. 4 WiGmoRE, EvIDENCE § 1048, pp. 2-6 (3rd Ed. 1940).
11. State v. Anderson, 363 Mo. 884, 892, 254 S.W.2d 609, 615 (1953). "Ex-
trajudicial admissions are, of course, admissible in evidence and are competent as
evidence of the existence of the facts which they tend to establish." Liebow v.
Jones Store Company, 303 S.W.2d 660, 664 (Mo. 1957). "It is of course always
proper to impeach a witness by proof of prior admissions inconsistent with presenttestimony."
12. 4 WiGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1048, pp. 2-5 (3rd Ed. 1940).
13. Id. at 3-5.
14. Id. at 5.
'512 [VoI.,:a33
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evidence for any admissions they contain.15 When multiple inconsistent pleadings
or counts are filed, however, they may not be used as admissions. 16
Macheca concerned multiple inconsistent pleadings, The rule applied in that
case is based upon Missouri pleading statutes.17 Under these statutes, "great liber-
ality is permitted in the joinder of parties and claims and alternative relief may
be sought in the same action."' 8 If the courts allowed the use of multiple pleas
as admissions, then anyone taking advantage of these pleading statutes would risk
being penalized for this action. In the noted case, if Macheca had realized that by
filing petitions against all three drivers he was endangering his chances of success,
he would probably not have taken advantage of the pleading statutes. This possi-
ble hazard will be avoided by applying the Macheca rule. Therefore, if the general
rule is applied, the rights created by the statutes and the purposes underlying the
statutes will be protected and promoted.19
The court in Macheca, however, believed that Johnson v. Flex-O-Lite Mfg.
Corp.20 suggests an exception to the general rule. This exception is applicable when
there is a factual inconsistency between allegations contained in the multiple plead-
ings and trial testimony. When this occurs, the pleading, or the portion containing
the inconsistency, should be admitted into evidence.
This exception can be justified by the following reasoning. When the pleading
party is able to testify to the facts it is presumed that he knows the facts. A
person who is aware of the facts has no need to file inconsistent pleadings, he should
plead only what actually happened. Therefore, if the pleader knows what happened
and still pleads inconsistently, he has no reason to complain if he must face these
inconsistent pleadings at trial.
In Richardson v. Wendel2 ' an example of this factual inconsistency appeared.
At trial the plaintiff testified that one of the defendants ran a red light. Earlier
allegations in abandoned pleadings were contrary to this testimony. These aban-
doned pleadings were then admitted into evidence because the factual inconsistency
between the pleadings and the testimony was present.
It should be recognized, however, that legal conclusions may not be relied on
as admissions. 22 The court in Giannone v. United States Steel Corp.28 excluded
the use of allegations in a petition as admissions, when they concluded the allega-
tions charged negligence but did not contain facts which demonstrated negligence.
15. For a full discussion of this area see Lawson, Pleadings and Practice-
Evidence-Admissibility of Pleadings into Evidence in Missouri, 27 Mo. L. REv.
258 (1962).
16. Macheca v. Fowler, 412 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Mo. 1967).
17. §§ 507.040, 509.050, 509.060, and 509.110 RSMo 1959.
18. Johnson v. Flex-O-Lite Mfg. Corp., 314 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Mo. 1958).
19. Id. at 79.
20. 314 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1958).
21. 401 S.W.2d 455, 460 (Mo. 1966).
22. Giannone v. United States Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544, 548 (3rd Cir. 1956).
The court in the note case indicates this rule would be applied in Missouri under
applicable circumstances.
23. Supra note 22, at 548.
1968] .:,
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Therefore, a general allegation of negligence would not come within the exception
unless it contained specific facts which were contradicted at trial.
When the admission is admitted under this exception as it was in Johnson,
2 4
Richardson,25 and Howell v. Dowe 20 the reasoning supporting that exception
suggests that the admission should be considered only for its impeaching function.
On this basis, the courts might be susceptible to an argument that the use of
admissions which enter under this exception will be limited to their impeaching
function and will not serve a substantive function.
The decision in Macheca indicates that the rule against the use of multiple
pleas as admissions was adopted to protect those who need to make use of the
pleading statutes. These would appear to be persons who are unaware of all the
facts and need to plead inconsistently or alternatively to protect their causes of
action. Johnson, however, indicates an exception to this rule. The exception applies
when a factual inconsistency appears between the party's testimony and his plead-
ings. A party who testifies to the facts should not need to plead inconsistently
because he can plead what actually happened. A party in this position is not one
of the persons the statute primarily attempts to protect and because of this does
not come within the rule followed in Macheca.
MICHAEL H. MAHER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATE COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT
CO-DEFENDANTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT?
Lollar v. United States1
Lollar and Ford were charged in the District of Columbia with robbery
and assault with a dangerous weapon. Defendants were indigent, and the district
court appointed a single attorney to represent them both. At trial, they were
convicted, and on appeal Lollar contended that the trial court's appointment of
one attorney to represent both defendants deprived him of his constitutional right
to the effective assistance of counsel.2 The court of appeals agreed; it reversed
and remanded for a new trial with instructions that Lollar should be represented
by his own couhsel.
In determining that Lollar had been denied effective assistance of coun-
sel, the court emphasized certain facets of the trial. Throughout his testimony,
co-defendant Ford referred to the appellant as "Miss Lollar," "Miss Lolly," or
"she" or "sister," 3 even though Lollar was a man. Furthermore, counsel allowed
24. 314 S.W.2d 75, 79-80 (Mo. 1958).
25. 401 S.W.2d 455, 460 (Mo. 1966).
26. 419 S.W.2d 257, 261 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
1. 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
2. Id. at 244; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Lollar had already admitted that he had been a homosexual all his life.
[V91-o3
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Lollar to take the stand despite his criminal record which was brought out on
cross-examination by the prosecution for impeachment purposes. This was prob-
ably unnecessary since Ford had already taken the stand and established their
defenses.4 Finally, counsel twice confused the two defendants and was corrected
by the judge.
The rule originally articulated in Glasser v. United Statesr,5 that "the 'assist-
ance of counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such
assistance be untrammelled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one
lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests," was incorporated into
the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.6
Acknowledging the well-settled rule that some conflict of interest must be
shown to have resulted from joint representation before a conviction will be set
aside, the court noted that the cases have not formulated a standard for de-
termining what constitutes sufficient prejudice to justify reversal.7 In light of the
Supreme Court's admonition in Glasser against requiring a strong showing of
prejudice as a prerequisite to reversal of a conviction s the court formulated its
own standard:
[O~nly where "'we can find no basis in the record for an informed specu-
lation' that appellant's rights were prejudicially affected," can the con-
4. 376 F.2d at 247.
5. 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1964): "ETihe court shall appoint separate coun-
sel for defendants who have such conflicting interests that they cannot properly
be represented by the same counsel ... "
7. 376 F.2d at 247. The court noted that there were evidently two lines
of authority: One group of cases requires a strong showing of actual prejudice
for a reversal, e.g., Lott v. United States, 218 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1955). This
was a conspiracy case in which the court seemed to acknowledge that a conflict
of interest had arisen at trial between the defendants. It stated, however, that
there had been "neither objection, claim, nor notice to the court of any alleged
conflict between the interests of the three defendants. . . . [Tiherefore . . . there
was no denial of their constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel."
Cf., United States v. Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241, 244 (6th Cir. 1966); Lugo v. United
States, 350 F.2d 858, 859 (9th Cir. 1965). In the latter case the court, in affirming
a conviction, refused to "create a conflict of interest out of mere conjecture as to
what might have been shown." In Penn v. Smyth, 188 Va. 367, 374, 49 S.E.2d
600, 603 (1948), the court stated: "[Tihe mere fact that counsel employed and
chosen by petitioner also was retained by and represented co-defendants with
conflicting interests does not compel a conclusion that the petitioner was prejudiced
thereby, and certainly not to such an extent as to oust the jurisdiction of the trial
court and render the proceeding therein a nullity."
Cases in the second group suggest that the mere possibility of prejudice
resulting from joint representation is enough to justify a reversal: e.g., Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942); Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355,
359 (6th Cir. 1954); Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1966); Commonwealth ex rel.
Whitling v. Russell, 406 Pa. 45, 48, 176 A.2d 641, 643 (1962).
8. 376 F.2d at 246. In Glasser the Court said that "the right to have the
assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge
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viction stand. . ,. In effect, we adopt the standard of"'reasonable doubt,"
a standard the Supreme Court recently said must govern whenever the
prosecution contends the denial of a constitutional right is merely harm-
less error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 . . . (1967). 9
Applying this standard, the court found that although indications of prejudice
were not sirong, the record failed to convince it beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was not prejudiced as a result of the joint representation.10
Chief Judge Bazelon, dissenting, indicated that he would seriously consider
reversing the conviction without a showing of prejudice if the case were one of
first impression. He also noted that an absolute rule requiring individual counsel
would free the reviewing court from speculating on what might have happened
had defendant been separately represented. However, he felt compelled to follow
the prevailing rule which requires a showing of prejudice and concluded that no
such showing had been made in the instant case.x'
The most significant aspect of this case is unquestionably the new standard 12
which the court announced that it will follow when reviewing a record to determine
whether a defendant has been denied "effective assistance" of counsel. Although
this court in 1965 explicitly denied that it was establishing a rule that co-defend-
ants were entitled to separate counsel as a matter of right,' 3 the rule enunciated
in the present case will have that effect.
In considering whether joint representation has deprived a defendant of his
right to effective assistance of counsel an appellate court has the entire record of
trial and proceedings before it. The trial court, on the other hand, in deciding
whether co-defendants' interests are in such conflict as to require separate counsel,
must make a decision on the basis of the existence of confessions, pleadings, and
proceedings which occur prior to trial and conjecture on what will occur at trial.
Some situations present little difficulty; for example, where one defendant
pleads not guilty and places most of the blame on his co-defendant, 14 the trial
judge should clearly appoint separate counsel. Difficult problems arise, however,
where a conflict of interest between two or more defendants is not apparent before
trial but develops during the trial.15 The fact that the trial court could not antici-
9. 376 F.2d at 247.
10. Ibid.
11. Id. at 248.
12. See note 9 supra.
13. Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
14. In Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1966), the court said:
"An obvious divergence of interest exists between a defendant who denies his guilt
and a co-defendant who not only confesses his own complicity but also accuses
the other of participation in the crime. The conflict is even more crucial in the
instant case by reason of the fact that Espin's [co-defendant's] confession attempts
to cast most of the blame for the robbery on to the 'other party."' Cf., Wright v.
Johnson, 77 F. Supp. 687, 690 (1948); Commonwealth ex rel. Whitling v. Russell,
406 Pa. 45, 48, 176 A.2d 641, 643 (1962).
15. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 73, 74 (1942); Craig v. United
States, 217 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 1954); Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d
359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1966). In
[Vol, 33
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pate such a conflict is of little significance16 and the reviewing court must reverse
any conviction in accordance with the rule enunciated in Glasser. I
Being unable to anticipate the plethora of situations -involving a conflict of
interest which may arise during the trial, the only way for a trial judge to avoid
reversal is unvaryingly to appoint separate counsel for co-defendants. This is
especially true in view of the stringent standard that the District of Columbia
Circuit has .announced that it will apply in reviewing a record for prejudice.1 7
On appeal, it would seem that most records will be subject to "informed specula-
tion that the appellant's rights were prejudicially affected . . . .,,i Indeed, the
court in Lollar acknowledged that the indications of prejudice were not very
strong.' 9
If the rule in the present case is followed by the other circuits and has the
anticipated effect of prompting trial judges automatically to appoint separate
counsel for indigent co-defendants, it will have at least two beneficial effects on
the administration of criminal law. First, the automatic appointment of separate
counsel will prevent unanticipated conflicts of interest arising ddring trial20 and
thus avoid reversals on appeal. Second, even though joint representation may not
engender a discernable conflict of interest between defendants, it may neverthe-
less impair counsel's effectiveness.2 1 The rule in the present case will render a de-
fendant's counsel more effective since he will be able to deal exclusively with the
protection of the interests of one person.
RicHAim D. MooRE
the Sawyer case, one of the defendants had given a confession incriminating the
other defendant. The state took the defense by surprise when it introduced the
confession into evidence. Both defendants had denied giving any statements or
confession to the officers. In the principle case the possibility of prejudice first
manifested itself at trial.
16. Sawyer v. Brough, 358 F.2d 70, 74 (4th Cir. 1966).
17. 376 F.2d at 247.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. See note 15 supra.
21. As the Court in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942) said:
"Irrespective of any conflict of interest, the additional burden of representing
another party may conceivably impair counsel's effectiveness." See also People v.
Lanigan, 22 Cal. 569, 576, 577, 140 P.2d 24, 29 (1943), and Campbell v. United
States, 352 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965), where the court discusses problems
inherent in joint representation. In the latter case, defense counsel admitted that
he had virtually ignored one defendant and had "unwittingly" made all comments
with reference to the other defendant. Moreover, defense counsel had made no
effort to dissociate one defendant from the other against whom the Government
had a much stronger case.
1968],.
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PRESUMPTIONS ARISING FROM PROOF OF MOTOR
VEHICLE OWNERSHIP
Chandler v. New Moon Homes, Inc.1
Plaintiff was injured in a collision between the car in which she was riding
and defendant's truck. The basis of the action against the corporate defendant
was respondeat superior. Evidence at trial was sufficient to show fault of the
truckdriver. No proof of driver's identity, mission, or employment, however, was
offered to show the respondeat superior elements of an employment relationship
and action within the scope of that relationship. The only proof of such elements
was the defendant's ownership of the truck. The trial court and the Kansas City
Court of Appeals held that once there is proof defendant owned the truck, a
procedural presumption arises that the truck was being driven by a servant of the
owner and within the scope of employment. Since the defendant offered no con-
trary evidence, this presumption continued and supported a verdict based on re-
spondeat superior. Upon transfer to the Supreme Court, the case was reversed.
The Supreme Court held that proof of ownership alone was not enough to raise a
presumption of employment and scope of employment.
Prior to Chandler the law in Missouri was somewhat unclear whether proof
of ownership alone created a presumption of both employment and scope, or if
employment was not to be presumed from proof of ownership, and scope could
only be presumed when ownership and employment were proved by evidence.
The main support for the presumption used by the trial court is the case of
Fleishman v. Polar Wave Ice and Fuel Co.2 There plaintiff was struck by a wagon
bearing defendant's name and coming from the direction of defendant's lot. As
this was sufficient to establish ownership, the plaintiff was held to have made out a
prima facie case of respondeat superior.3 Several appellate court cases had followed
1. 418 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
2. 148 Mo. App. 117, 127 S.W. 660 (St. L. Ct. App. 1910).
3. Eventually the rule became one of a procedural presumption rather than
a prima facie case. Arnold v. Haskins, 347 Mo. 320, 147 S.W.2d 469 (1941); Ross
v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 339 Mo. 982, 98 S.W.2d 717 (1936). The difference between
procedural presumption and prima facie case under the usual analysis is significant.
A procedural presumption has the effect of placing the burden of producing evidence
on the party not desiring a finding of the presumed fact. In the Fleishman situation
the presumed facts were employment and scope, if the triers of fact were to find
that defendant owned the vehicle. Such findings being adverse to defendant's
interest, defendant would normally come forward with evidence opposite the pre-
sumed facts of employment and scope. This evidence having been introduced, the
presumption would disappear, and the plaintiff would be required to meet his
production burden without the aid of any presumption. "'Presumptions, may be
looked on as the bats of the law, flitting in the twilight but disappearing in the
sunshine of actual facts."' Mokowik v. Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs
R.R., 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94 S.W. 256, 262 (1906). A prima facie case is made out
when the party having the duty of producing evidence on a certain fact has satis-
fied the judge that the jury should be allowed to consider whether that certain
fact exists or not. The significance here is that the proponent of the fact is assured
of getting a jury verdict as to the fact. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2494 (3rd ed. 1940).
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the Fleishman rule.4 The Missouri Supreme Court had never met the question
squarely, since in all cases prior to Chandler evidence showed both vehicle owner-
ship and an employment relationship; nevertheless, the court had cited the
Fleishman rule in dictum.5
The leading Missouri case in the area is Guthrie v. Holmes.0 There the driver
was shown to be defendant's chauffeur and operating defendant's pleasure car at
the time of plaintiff's injury. The court held as follows:
. .. [Ilf it be proved (as here) that the car was owned by defendant, and
if it be further proved (as here) that the chauffeur was in the general
employment of defendant, then the presumption arises that such chauffeur
was within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. This,
however, is as broad as the rule goes.7
Many cases have cited the Guthrie rule,8 and some have considered it a dispositive
pronouncement of the law in this area.9 At least one appellate court case has
interpreted Guthrie as being applicable only to the pleasure car situation; therefore,
the Fleishman rule may be applied to business vehicles. 10 Another appellate court
case reasoned that Guthrie did not preclude allowing a presumption of employment
and scope from proof of ownership only."z Due to the limiting language of Guthrie,
it is questionable whether the Fleishman rule should have been considered good
law. At any rate, both the Fleishman and Guthrie rules seemed to persist as distinct
presumptions, and such was recognized by the Supreme Court as recently as
1963.12
4. E.g., Harris v. Mound City Yellow Cab Co., 367 S.W.2d 43 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1963); Hampe v. Versen, 224 Mo. App. 1144, 32 S.W.2d 793 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1930); Mann v. Stewart Sand Co., 211 Mo. App. 256, 243 S.W. 406 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1922).
5. Arnold v. Haskins, 347 Mo. 320, 147 S.W.2d 469 (1941); Barz v. Fleisch-
man Yeast Co., 308 Mo. 288, 271 S.W. 361 (En Banc 1925); O'Malley v. Heman
Construction Co., 255 Mo. 386, 164 S.W. 565 (1914).
6. 273 Mo. 215, 198 S.W. 854 (En Banc 1917). The case of Hays v. Hogan,
273 Mo. 1, 200 S.W. 286 (1917), is also an important case in the area. There it
was shown that defendant was the owner of the car and father of the driver, but
there was no evidence showing the son was an agent or the servant at the time the
cause of action arose. The court rejected any presumption of agency.
7. Guthrie v. Holmes, supra note 6, at 233, 198 S.W. at 858.
8. Terminal Warehouse of St. Joseph, Inc. v. Reiners, 371 S.W.2d 311 (Mo.
1963); Snead v. Sentlinger, 327 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. 1959); Berry v. Emery, Bird,
Thayer Dry Goods Co., 357 Mo. 808, 211 S.W.2d 35 (1948); Collins v. Leahy, 347
Mo. 133, 146 S.W.2d 609 (1941); State ex rel Steinbruegge v. Hostetter, 342 Mo.
341, 115 S.W.2d 802 (En Banc 1938); State ex rel Kurz v. Bland, 333 Mo. 941,
64 S.W.2d 638 (1933).
9. Snead v. Sentlinger, supra note 8 (Guthrie rule is a "bare minimum");
Berry v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., sulpra note 8 (Gu, tlrie facts are
"barely sufficient").
10. Mann v. Stewart Sand Co., 211 Mo. App. 256, 243 S.W. 406 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1922).
11. Rockwell v. Standard Stamping Co., 210 Mo. App. 168, 241 S.W. 979
(St. L. Ct. App. 1923).
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Clandler has clarified the rule and seemingly has settled the. law, Expressly
overruling those cases citing Fleishman, the court decided the rule should not go
beyond that allowed in Gutlhrie.13 It was reasoned that a presumption. of employ-
ment and scope from ownership alone can no longer. be justified, as a matter of
necessity, "because under our present day discokrery procedures whatever the
defendant knows about- agency and scope of employment. te .plaintiff can also
know... ." -14 Pointing out that interrogatories and requests for admission aid the
plaintiff inexpensively and promptly, the court concluded'that failure to extend
Guthrie would not appear to "cause meritorious causes to fail through inability
of plaintiff to produce affirmative evidence of essential facts."' 5
The majority rule in the United States is contrary to that of Chandler in that
a presumption of agency and scope of employment will be raised upom proof of
ownership alone.' 0 In a substantial number of jurisdictions, however, thq majority
rule has been repudiated. 17 These courts and other courts not adopting the majority
rule have employed various solutions in resolving the problem. Several have recog-
nized a rule similar to that followed in Chandler.18 Some of the cases are willing
to presume agency and scope of employment, if it is shown the vehicle was in the
service of the owner's business. 19 For example, showing 'that ice had' just been
13. Chandler v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 418 S.W.Zd 130 (Mo. En Banc
1967). The requirement of "general employment" could cause some problems in
the future application of the rule. The Court explained that the term did not desig-
nate any superior rank, but "it is used in the sense of not being limited to a
particular class, type, or field of employment." (at n. 2, p. 133).
14. Id. at 135.
15. Id. at 137.
16. E.g., Stanley v. Hayes, 276 Ala. 532, 165 So.2d 84 (1964); Baker v.
Maseeh, 20 Ariz. 201, 179 Pac. 53 (1919); Dowling v. Nicholson, 101 Fla. 672,
135 So. 288 (1931); Brill v. Davajon, 51 111. App.2d 445, 201 N.E.2d 253 (1964);
Hoerr v. Hanline, 219 Md. 413, 149 A.2d 378 (1958); Coopersmith v. Kalt, 119
N.J.L. 474, 196 At. 649 (1938); Boydston v. Jones, 177 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1944); Bradley v. S. L. Savidge, Inc., 13 Wash.2d 28, 123 P.2d 780 (1942);
Payne v. Kinder, 147 W.Va. 352, 127 S.E.2d 726 (1962); Gehloff v. De Marce, 204
Wis. 404, 234 N.W. 717 (1931). A similar rule has been embodied in statutes.
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-183 (1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-71.1(b)(1951); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1037, 59-1038 (1955). See also 9 WIGaMORE, EvI-
DrNCE § 2510a (3rd ed. 1940); McCoMIvlcK, EVIDENCE § 309 (1954); 42 A.L.R.
898 (1926); 74 A.L.R. 951 (1931); 96 A.L.R. 634 (1935); 27 A.L.R.2d 167 (1953).
17. Roach v. Parker, 48 Del. 519, 107 A.2d 798 (1954); Durden v. Maddox,
73 Ga. App. 491, 37 S.E.2d 219 (1946); Gainesboro Telephone Co. v. Thomas, 234
Ky. 373, 28 S.W.2d 34 (1930); Tice v. Crowder, 119 Kan. 494, 240 Pac. 964(1925); Merchants Co, v. Tracy, 175 Miss. 49, 166 So. 340 (1936); Stumpf v. Mont-
gomery, 101 Okla. 257, 226 Pac. 65 (1924).
18. Casteel v. Yantis-Harper Tire Co., 183 Ark. 475, 36 S.W.2d 406 (1931);
F. E. Fortenberry & Sons, Inc. v. Malmberg, 97 Ga. App. 162, 102 S.E.2d 667(1958); Manion v. Waybright, 59 Idaho 643, 86 P.2d 181 (1938); Gainesboro
Telephone Co. v. Thomas, supra note 16; Merchants Co. v. Tracy, supra note 17;
Stumpf v. Montgomery, supra note 17.
19. Webb v. Dixie-Ohio Express Co., 291 Ky. 692, 165 S.W.2d 539 (1942);
Cofield v. Borgdorf, 238 La. 297, 115 So.2d 357 (1959); Wehling v. Linder, 248
Mich. 241, 226 N.W. 880 (1929) (the vehicle must be driven "incident to the
owner's business").
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delivered to one-of defendant's customers would be enough to* raise. the presump-
tion.20 A distinction between pleasure and commercial vehicles- is drawn by some
courts, applying the majority rule to the latter but not the former.2l The leading
Kansas decision has language to the effect that plaintiff must offer proof of agency
and scope of employment, before a case is made out (i.e., plaintiff is not aided by
any presumption arising from ownership). 22
At least two jurisdictions couch the rule in terms of inferences. In Oregon an
inference of agency and scope may be made upon proof of ownership alone;28
while in California the plaintiff must also show employment before an inference of
scope is allowed. 24 Both courts say that the inference may be overcome by
defendant's direct uncontradicted evidence opposite the presumed facts. 25 In Mis-
souri the defendant may overcome the presumption 'by offering "substantial evi-
dence tending to show the real facts ... ,,26 Even though the California and Oregon
courts speak in terms of inferences, while Missouri and other jurisdictions use the
term presumption, the operation of the rules would seem to result in only minimal
differences in the plaintiff's ability to survive a motion for a directed verdict.
The rationale for any of the above plaintiff-aiding presumptions or inferences
is naturally the most important consideration from an analytical standpoint. A
few courts justify presumptions in this area on probability.27 It has been said that
"it is reasonable to presume that a person driving another's vehicle on a public
highway is doing so as the agent of the owner in the pursuit of the owner's bus-
iness and within the scope of his employment." 28 Judge Learned Hand denies the
propriety of basing such a presumption on probability. He reasons that a pro-
cedural presumption cannot logically be based on probability, for if it were then
there would be no need for it originally 29 Also rejecting the probability argument,
20. Cofield v. Borgdorf, supra note 19.
21. McDougall v. Glenn Cartage Co., 169 Ohio St. 522, 160 N.E.2d 266 (1959);
Double v. Myers, 305 Pa. 266, 157 Adt. 610 (1931). Other cases have repudiated
any such distinction. E.g., Chandler v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 130(Mo. En Banc 1967); Webb v. Dixie-Ohio Express Co., 291 Ky. 692, 165 S.W.2d
539 (1942).
22. Tice v. Crowder, 119 Kan. 494, 240 Pac. 964 (1925). Accord, Lammana
v. Stevens, 5 Boyce 402, 93 Atl. 962 (Del. 1915).
23. Judson v. Bee Hive Auto Service Co., 136 Ore. 1, 294 Pac. 588 (1930),
rev'd on rekearing 136 Ore. 5, 297 Pac. 1050 (1931).
24. Stewart v. Norsigian, 64 Cal. App.2d 540, 150 P.2d 554 (1944). Contra,
Malmstrom v. Bridges, 8 Cal. App.2d 5, 47 P.2d 336 (1935) (dictum only re-
quired ownership).
25. Judson v. Bee Hive Auto Service Co., 136 Ore. 1, 294 Pac. 588 (1930),
rev'd on rehearing 136 Ore. 5, 297 Pac. 1050 (1931). Maupin v. Solomon, 41 Cal.
App. 323, 183 Pac. 198 (1919).
26. Rosser v. Standard Milling Co., 312 S.W.2d 106, 111 (1958); Snead v.
Sentlinger, 327 S.W.2d 202 (1959) ("substantial controverting evidence").
27. Pa. R.R. v. Lord, 159 Md. 518, 151 Atl. 400 (1930); J.A. & E.D. Trans-
port Co. v. Rusin, 202 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), rev'd on other grounds,
206 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
28. Ahlberg v. Griggs, 158 Minn. 11, 196 N.W. 652, 653 (1924).
29. Alpine Forwarding Co. v. Pa. R.R., 60 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1932).
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Chandler flatly denies that general experience in today's widespread use of vehicles
supports such a presumption.30
Another possible reason is given by Wigmore: "A person who owns a valuable
and dangerous apparatus should be cautious against its misuse by irresponsible
persons." If misuse is the result, then such person should bear the risk of not
obtaining evidence.3 ' The court in Tice v. Crowder responds, "The section quoted
from Wigmore reveals the bug under the chip-liability of the owner because of
ownership." To find liability where defendant's sole relation to the injury is as
owner is surely an "exemplification of the deep-pocket theory of liability. '3 2 Cer-
tainly this interplay is revealing of factors, philosophical though they may be, that
are not normally found expressed in reported opinions, but could be the most im-
portant of all.3 3 Whether such a social policy is the basis for the Chandler rule is
purely conjectural.
The most important justification and the one cited most frequently by the
courts is the owner's superior access to information as to who was operating the
vehicle and in what capacity. As such the courts adopt a policy of requiring the
defendant to come forward with this information or suffer a directed verdict as to
the presumed fact.3 4 It has been admitted a presumption may work an occasional
hardship on vehicle owners and employers, but a less liberal rule, it is contended,
would defeat a larger number of meritorious claims because of the unavailability of
information.s 5
As noted above, the Chandler court rejected this "owner's superior access"
notion on the ground that discovery procedures enable the plaintiff in a practical
way to know what defendant knows. The court certainly was not compelled to this
conclusion. Prior Missouri cases reason that the advent of- discovery devices has
not obviated the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, since discovery has some practical inade-
quacies.30 Similarly, Chandler could have said discovery devices are adequate for
plaintiff to discover employment but suffer from practical inadequacies in discover-
ing scope. Had such a position been taken it would be clear why the court was
willing to retain the Guthrie presumption of scope while rejecting a presumption
of employment. The court, however, distinguishes employment and scope from res
30. Chandler v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 130 (Mo. En Bane 1967).
31. 9 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2510a (3rd ed. 1940).
32. Tice v. Crowder, 119 Kan. 494, 500, 502, 240 Pac. 964, 965-966 (1925).
33. In Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933), the Supreme Court recognized
that presumptions in this area are a judicial response to the inability of the re-
spondeat superior doctrine to cope "with the menacing problem of practical responsi-
bility for motor accidents."
34. Baker v. Maseeh, 20 Ariz. 201, 179 Pac. 53 (1919); West v. Kern, 88
Ore. 247, 171 Pac. 413 (1918); Pa. R.R. v. Lord, 159 Md. 518, 151 AtI. 400
(1930); Philip v. Schlager, 214 Wis. 370, 253 N.W. 394 (1934) (presumption is
based solely on such policy and not upon any inference of fact).
35. West v. Kern, supra note 34; Enea v. Pfister, 180 Wis. 329, 192 N.W. 1018
(1923).
36. Bone v. General Motors Corp., 322 S.W.2d 916 (Mo. 1959); Jones v.
Terminal R. Ass'n, 363 Mo. 1210, 258 S.W.2d 643 (1953), Warner v. Terminal
R. Ass'n, 363 Mo. 1082, 257 S.W.2d 75 (1953).
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ipsa loquitur on the- basis that they are a "much narrower field of inquiry" than
res ipsa loquitur and can readily be discovered.3 7
In doing this, Chandler has rejected the main basis for the Gutkrie rule pre-
suming scope of employment. As such, what is the status of the Guthrie rule in
Missouri? The court says that the rule should not go beyond that allowed in
Guthrie. This dictum seems to indicate the court's willingness to retain the Gutrrie
rule, but at the same time no language in Chandler indicates a reason for presuming
scope of employment. One reason for the presumption could be the social policy
argument advanced by Wigmore. Another could be stare decisis, as the Guthrie
rule has been cited and followed in a long line of cases.38 Should the court be
asked to overrule Guthrie in some future case, either of these reasons could be
used to sustain the Guthrie rule.
As a final point it should be noted that Chandler stands for the proposition
that discovery devices may be a substitute for procedural presumptions. As such,
Chandler should find its place in future arguments for overruling presumptions or
against the cieation of new presumptions. Presumptions based on the superior ac-
cess to information idea' will be especially vulnerable to the Chandler rationale.
RIcHARD NIXON
CORPORATIONS-RIGHT OF A FRACTIONAL SHARE
TO VOTE FOR DIRECTORS
Benson v. Eleven-Twenty St. Charles Co.1
The Eleven-Twenty St. Charles Co. was incorporated in 1947 to purchase
and manage parking garages in St. Louis. Between 1947 and 1964 it paid substan-
tial dividends and increased its net worth to around $1,000,000. The corporation
had three shareholders, three directors and ten shares of stock. Mandel, the organ-
izer, was the holder of five shares of stock, and Gitt and Benson each held tvo
and one half shares. Shareholder agreements governing the sale of shares indicate
that Mandel was to have control of the corporation. After a disagreement with
Mandel, Gitt and Benson decided to challenge his control of the board of directors
at the annual shareholders meeting in February, 1964. They did this by nominating
two directors instead of one. Mandel also nominated two directors. Benson and
Gitt attempted to cast seven and one half votes for each of their nominees. Mandel,
as president and presiding officer, ruled that fractional shares could not vote. He
then cast his fifteen votes for his nominees and declared them elected.
37. Chandler v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 130, 137 (Mo. En Banc
1967).
38. Cases cited note 8 supra.
1. 422 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. 1968).
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Benson brought an action to have the election declared void and -the corpora-
tion liquidated and dissolved on the theory that had the fractional shares been
allowed to vote, there would have been a dead-lock in the election of directors that
would allow a court 'of equity to -liquidate the corporation under -the theory of
Handlan v. Handlan2 or section 351.485 of the Missouri business corporation laws.
The trial court held for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme
Court of Missouri. The supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial court,
reasoning that section 351.300 RSMo 1959 did not allow fractional shares to vote
unless otherwise provided, and that there was no provision otherwise in this case.
It said that the decision was consistent with its interpretation of Article 11, Section
6 of the Missouri Constitution (provision for cumulative voting) to permit classi-
fication of common and preferred stock as voting and non-voting. -
The court discussed the Pennsylvania case of Comonwnwealt. ex rel. Cart-
wright v. Cartwright3 which held that while the legislature could change the
corporation laws to allow fractional shares to vote, the current statutes did not
permit fractional shares to vote. The Missouri court failed to distinguish the
Pennsylvania constitution and statutes from the Missouri Constitution and statutes.
In Pennsylvania the constitutional provisions determine only that votes may be
apportioned among several candidates when voting for directors 4 The number
of votes each shareholder may have in elections for directors is determined by
statute.5 In Missouri the Constitution determines both the number of votes a
shareholder may have and how they may be cast in an election for directors.6
In Pennsylvania the legislature can change the number of votes a shareholder may
have; it cannot change the way the votes may be cast. In Missouri both the num-
ber of votes and the method of voting are guaranteed by the Constitution and
the legislature is without power to change either one. Thus, the only case the
court could cite for the proposition that fractional shares can not vote is clearly
distinguishable.
Article 11, Section 6 of the Missouri Constitution says: "... each shareholder
shall have the right to cast as many votes in the aggregate as shall equal the
number of shares held by him, multiplied by the number of directors or managers
to be elected. . . ." It might be argued that this provision creates a requirement
against non-voting shares of any kind. However, in State ex Tel. Frank v. Swanger
the court held that the shareholders could agree that preferred stock could not
2. 360 Mo. 1150, 232 S.W.2d 944 (1950).
3. 350 Pa. 638, 40 A.2d 30 (1944); see Annot. 155 A.L.R. 1088 (1944).
4. PA. CONST. art. 16, § 4. "In all elections for directors' or managers of
a corporation each member or shareholder may cast the whole number of his votes
for one candidate, or distribute them upon two or more candidates, as they prefer."
5. "In all elections for directors, every shareholder entitled to vote shall have
the right in person or by proxy, to multiply the number of votes to which he may
be entitled by the number of directors to be elected, and he may cast the whole
number of such votes for one candidate or he may distribute them among any two
or more candidates." 15 PA. STAT. tit. 2852, § 505 (1936).
6. Mo. CoNsT. art. 11, § 6.
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vote- for directors when .they organized the corporation That case was decided
in 1905 uideiATticle'12, Section 6 of the Constitution of 1875 which -was identical
to' the current Article 11; -Section 6. In 1963 the court reaffirmed Swanger in
Shapiro v. Tropicana Lanes, Inc.8 The Shapiro case allowed a corporation to
issue non-voting common stock. The theory of these cases is that when the consti-
tution sys- "each shareholder shall have the right to cast as many votes" it means
each ,shareholder having the right to vote under the articles of incorporation.
Shareholders can 'agree, at the time they make this contract that only certain
shares may vote and be'within the constitutional provisions.9 But without a
contractual denial. in the articles, with only a statutory limitation at variance with
constitutional law, these cases might be interpreted as allowing all shares the right
to vote for directors. In -the case noted there was no such denial in the articles.
Section 351.300, RSMo.1959 allows a corporation to issue either certificates for
fractional :shares or scrip in lieu thereof. This section has been the same since 1943.
It is a copy of the now repealed section 157.22 of the Illinois Business Corporation
Act. In 1957 -Illinois modified section 157.22 to comply with section 22 of the
Model Business Corporation Act.' o That section guarantees fractional shares voting
rights. The court in the Benson case assumed that when the Missouri General As-
sembly did not copy- section 22 in 1963 when it revised the corporation laws that
it did not, intend for fractional shares to vote. This may be an erroneous assump-
tion. When Illinois changed its statute from the section identical to section 351.300
to section 22 of the, Model Act, it was explained to the Chicago Bar that the
changes were..to clarify, other points and no mention was made of any change in
the voting rights of fractional shares.'1 The annotators of the Model Business
Corporation Act- assumed that section 351.300 allowed fractional shares to vote,12
as did .the author of an article in the Journal of the Missouri Bar.'3 There is
authority to,.the contrary.'4 Allowing fractional shares to vote under section 351.300
would seem to be in keeping with a literal interpretation of the constitutional
cumulative voting guarantee and the requirement of the Swanger and Shapiro
cases that non-voting shares be created by shareholder agreement at the time of
incorporation.
The Missouri corporation laws recognize the difference between voting for
directors and voting on other matters. Section 351.245(1) says: "Each outstanding
share entitled'to vote . . . shall be entitled to one vote on each matter...
Sectioii 351.245(3) dealing with the election of directors says: "Each shareholder
shall have the right to cast as many votes in the aggregate as shall equal the num-
7. -190 Mo. 651, 89 S.W. 872 (Mo. En Banc 1905).
8. 371 S-W.2d 237 (Mo. 1963).
9. Id. at 241.
10. Ill. Laws, 1957 p. 2192 § 1.
11. Carson, 1957 Amendments to the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 39
CHI. B. REc. 259, 260 (1957).
12. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION Acr ANNOTATED § 22, para. 2.02 (1960).
13. Kraus, Cumulative Voting for Directors in Missouri Corporations, 16
J. Mo. B. 441, 446 (1960).
14. Rosenbaum, Classified Boards in Missouri, 32 Mo. L. REV. 251 n.6 (1967).
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ber of voting shares so held . . . multipled by the number of directors. .. ." The
former section is phrased in terms of the rights of the share and the latter is
phrased in terms of the rights of the shareholder. Since the Constitution covers
only the election of directors, it is allowable for the former section to restrict
"each" share to "one" vote and in so doing disfranchise fractional shares. However,
under the Shapiro case all shares are entitled to vote for directors except those
disfranchised by the contract.' 5 Thus, when the latter section refers to "the num-
ber of voting shares," it necessarily is including all shares not made non-voting by
the articles of incorporation. Unless fractional shares are made non-voting by the
articles, they should be able to vote under section 351.245(3).
It is submitted that the court erred in the Benson case. A literal reading of
the constitutional cumulative voting guarantee and the statutes would seem to
require that fractional shares be allowed to vote for directors. Such a decision
would be consistent with the theory of the Shapiro case. It would not cause any
inconvenience to large public corporations that potentially have many fractional
shares because the Shapiro case would allow them to be disfranchised in the
articles. Since cases where fractional shares will be significant are not likely to come
up frequently, the significance of the Benson case would seem to be a warning to
drafters of articles of incorporation to provide therein for fractional shares.
GEORGE LANE ROBERTS, JR.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION SUBROGATION: WHEN MUST A
SUBROGATED EMPLOYER PAY A PORTION OF RECOVERY EXPENSES?
Maryland Cas. Co. v. General Electric Co.1
Respondent's deceased husband, an employee of appellant Maryland Casualty
Company's insured, was killed in the course of his employment due to a defective
high voltage switch manufactured by General Electric Company. A workmen's
compensation award of $15,500 was entered in favor of the respondent and there-
after the appellant, claiming subrogation to the rights of the employee or his
survivors under section 287.150, RSMo, 19592 filed suit against General Electric
15. Shapiro v. Tropicana Lanes, Inc., 371 S.W.2d (Mo. 1963).
1. 418 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
2. § 287.150(1), RSMo (1959), provides that, "Where a third person is
liable to the employee or to the dependents, for the injury or death, the employer
shall be subrogated to the right of the employee or . . . dependents against such
third person, and the recovery by such employer shall not be limited to the amount
payable as compensation to such employee or dependents, but such employer may
recover any amount which such employee or his dependents would have been
entitled to recover. Any recovery by the employer against such third person, in
excess of the compensation paid by the employer, after deducting the expenses
of making such recovery shall be paid forthwith to the employee or to the de-
pendents, and shall be treated as an advance payment by the employer, on account
of any future installments of compensation."
[Vol. 33
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Company for the employee's wrongful death.s The respondent joined appellant's
suit as co-plaintiff, consulted with the appellant's attorney and testified at the
trial which wa conducted by the appellant's attorney and resulted in a recovery
of $25,000 from General Electric Company.
The present dispute arose over distribution of the recovery proceeds between
the appellant and the respondent. The respondent contended that recovery dis-
tribution should have been made under subsection 3 of section 287.150, 'RSMo
1959,4 and appellant contended that- distribution should have been made under
subsection 1, thereof. Subsection 3 applies only vhen the recovery has been effected
by the employee or his survivor and requires that the employer or his insurer pay
a proportionate share of the recovery expenses. Subsection 1 places the entire ex-
pense burden on the employee or his survivor because under this subsection the
employee or survivor realizes a gain from the recovery only when expenses have
been paid and the employer has been fully reimbursed for the amount of the
compensation award.
The trial court found that the recovery had been effected by the respondent
and allocated the proceeds pursuant to subsection 3. The supreme court reversed,
holding that joining as co-plaintiff, conferring with the appellant's attorney and
testifying at trial was not enough to effect recovery.
This decision is significant in that it provides the first reported judicial inter-
pretation of the words effect recovery as used in the context of subsection 3. The
decision gives no definitive test for future cases other than several quoted defini-
tions of effect recovery i.e., "accomplished, brought to pass, completed, produced,
carried to completion or consummated," and the language: "We will not allow an
employee or his dependents double recovery5 in the absense of clear intention on
3. § 287.150 RSMo (1959), provides that when a third party causes an
injury for which the employer is obligated under the workmen's compensation act,
the employer or his insurer is subrogated to the employee's rights against the third
party. This statute has been interpreted to allow either the employee or the em-
ployer to recover the total amount due and the party recovering becomes trustee
of the other party's interest in the recovery proceeds, McKenzie v. Missouri Stables
Inc., 34 S.W.2d 136 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930). The employer will have an interest
in the recovery in all cases because his right in the proceeds has priority over the
employee's right. The employee participates in the proceeds only after the em-
ployer has been reimbursed for payments made under the compensation award.
The employee will have an interest in the recovery only if the amount received
is larger than the amount of the compensation award.
4. 287.150(3), RSMo (1959), provides that, "Whenever recovery against
the third person is effected by the employee or his dependents, the employer shall
pay from his share of the recovery a proportionate share of the expenses of the
recovery, including a reasonable attorney fee. After the expenses and the attorney's
fee has been paid the balance of the recovery shall be apportioned between the
employer and the employee or his dependents in the same ratio that the amount
due the employer bears to the total amount recovered, or the balance of the
recovery may be divided between the employer and the employee or his dependents
shall be paid forthwith and any part of the recovery paid to the employee or his
dependents under this section shall be treated by them as an advance payment
by the employer on account of any future installments of compensation."
5. Presumably, the term double recovery refers to cases in which the em-
ployee's combined proceeds from the compensation award and the third party suit
exceed his theoretical net proceeds after expenses had he recovered only from the
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the part of the legislature that we do so. The law favors a construction which avoids
unjust or unreasonable results."8 The court also intimated that a broad interpre-
tation of. the words effect recovery would in reality be a judicial repeal of subsec-
tion 1.7
The court apparently feels that subsection 3 applies only in cases where the
employee is clearly and primarily responsible for gaining the recovery. When the
employee has met this burden is a question of fact, but it would seem. that in most
cases the original filing of the petition would be a requisite element of-his burden.
The court's narrow interpretation would seem to be consistent with the
purpose of subsection 3. Such subrogation and expense allocation statutes have
been generally described as techniques by which legislatures provide monetary
third party and had not received a compensation award. This result may be
deemed a double recovery because the employee has been fully indemnified by the
third party and has also received compensation from the employer.
It should be noted that the relationship between the employer and employee
is not that of indemnity insurer and insured. The latter relationship is based on
contract and normally places the burden of litigation expenses on the insurer, thus
indemnifying the insured for both injuries and litigation costs. The employer's
obligation, however, is based on statute and the limits of that obligation must be
determined by statute interpretation. By enactment of subsection 1 in 1925 the
legislature elected to place the expense burden on the employee and leave him
in the position he would have been in if there had been no compensation award.
The subsequent enactment of subsection 3 in 1955 allows the employee a double
recovery and the court's disapproval of double recovery would indicate that only
when the employee has clearly effected the recovery will subsection 3 be invoked.
6. In finding that it was improper to apply subsection 3 in the principle case,
the court was precluded from resolving the parties' dispute as to the proper method
of allocating proceeds under this subsection. Interpretation of the- subsection- 3
distribution formula is in a state of confusion due to the Kansas City Court of
AppeaFs decision in Knox v. Land Constr. Co., 345 S.W.2d 244 (K.C. Mo. App.
1961). One aspect of that court's interpretation dealt with the statutory language,
"After the expenses and the attorney's fee has been paid the balance of the recover
shall be apportioned between the employer and the employee or his dependents in
the same ratio that the amount due to the employer bears to the total amount
recovered." This language was held to mean that after the expenses have been
deducted from the recovery fund, the employer's share of the remaining fund
shall be determined by multiplying the remaining fund by the ratio that the
total amount of the compensation award bears to the total amount recovered.
The excess is distributed to the employee. The court chose to ignore the last sentence
of subsection 3 which provides that "any part of the recovery paid to the em-
ployee or his dependents . . . shall be treated by them as an advance payment
by the employer on account of any future installments of compensation."
Both aspects of the Knox interpretation have been criticized in Brown,
Subrogation in the Missouri Workmen's Compen.ration Act-Section 287.150,
26 Mo. 'L. REv. 336 (1961), have been disregarded by the Missouri Jndustrial
Commission in Genevieve v. Morrell Meat Packing Co., IND. COMM. Mo., ZZ-26007
(1960), in ruling that the employee's distributed share should be-treated as advance
award payments and that the employer's share of the net recovery after expenses
should be determined by the ratio that the amount of award -actually paid at
date of recovery bears to the total recovery. The Knox interpretation clearly mag-
nifies the double recovery effect of subsection 3 and is contrary to the principle
case's mandate against double recovery.
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incentives for both employers and employees to vigorously seek recovery against
third parties.8 The court's interpretation of effect recovery will not destroy the
incentive provided by subsection 3 but will induce greater diligence because em-
ployees will have to vigorously seek recovery to receive the benefits of this
subsection.
Probable legislative purpose is apparent if the history of subsections 1 and 3
are viewed together. Subsection 1 was enacted in 19259 and subsequently the
purpose thereof was held to be to protect employers and assure that the ultimate
discharge of any obligation to the employee would be made by blameworthy third
partes.10 The rationale of this interpretation was that the employer should -be made
whole as nearly as possible and that the employee should bear litigation costs just
as he would have if there had been recovery against the third party with no work-
men's compensation award.
In 1955 subsection 3 was added to the statute. 1 Since subsection 1 was not
amended or deleted, it would seem that the legislature intended it to serve the
same function it had in the past and that the addition of subsection 3 was intended
to cure an inequity. Consistent with this reasoning are suggestions that the pur-
pose of subsection 3 is to provide an equitable allocation of costs when the em-
ployee actually handles the litigation.' 2 Under this interpretation it is doubtful
that an employer who has shouldered more than half the work load' was intended
to be deprived of a subsection 1 distribution. As the court commented, the legisla-
ture did not word the clause in terms of contribution or substantial contribution
to effecting the recovery but used the absolute term effect recovery.13 It would
seem that anything less than half the labors of recovery could not logically be
deemed an effecting of recovery.
Undoubtedly, cases might arise where cooperation between parties is such
that it would be extremely difficult to designate one of them as primarily responsi-
ble for the recovery. However, in such cases it is likely that the rapport will be
such that a distribution agreement will be reached as is permitted by subsection
3.14 Should this not be the case, the court's language discouraging double re-
covery might be interpreted to justify a finding for the employer. In terms of
primary responsibility, it could be said that the employee is equally but not pri-
marily responsible for the recovery.
In view of such a test, it would seem proper to inquire as to the circumstances
in which an employee could hope to effect a recovery. If the employee files the
petition he will clearly be able to prosecute the action and effect the recovery.
8. 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 1042 (1958).
9. Mo. Laws 1925, at 374, § 11.
10. McKenzie v. Missouri Stables, Inc., 34 S.W.2d 136 (St. L. Mo. App. 1930).
11. Mo. Laws 1955, at 597, § 1.
12. Brown, Subrogation in the Missouri Workmen's Compensation Act-
Section 287.150, 26 Mo. L. REV. 336 (1961); Genevieve v. Morrell Meat Packing
Co., IND. COMM. Mo., ZZ-26007 (1966).
13. Maryland Cas. Co. v. General Electric Co., 418 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Mo.
En Banc 1967).
14. See note 4 supra.
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. -If the employer files the petition, the employee may join the .'action, and
conceivably would be entitled to investigate and to call witnesses and. conduct
cross-examination at trial. Thus, ;n unusually ingenious and industrious employee
might be-primarily responsible for the recovery even though the employer was first
to the courthouse.
If the employer is first to file a petition, it is not clear that the employee might
not file a second petition thus creating a race to judgment with the winner being
deemed to have effected recovery.15 A judgment in one action would clearly have a
collateral estoppel or res judicata effect as to the other action,10 but it is not
clear that,.the defendant would be able to have the second action abated prior to a
judgment in the first suit. 17 If the defendant does not seek an abatement or if the
court refuses to grant it, the employee might well effect the recovery via a second
petition.
By providing a procedure whereby the employee's share of expenses depends
on who effects the recovery, the legislature has created a competitive relationship
between the employee and the employer in a situation where their co-operative
efforts, would seem a more desirable objective. It would seem that if both the
employee and the employer wish to take part in prosecuting the third party suit,
an early agreement as to allocation of litigation labors and expenses is the only
way to guarantee both parties an equitable share of the proceeds and assure that
the best possible case is presented at the trial.
LARRY G. ScHuLz
15. Either the employer or the employee or both together may recover against
the third party. State ex rel. W. J. Menefee Constr. Co. v. Curtis, 321 S.W.2d 713
(Spr. Mo. App. 1959).
16. There is but one cause of action, Q'Hanlon Report, Inc. v. Needles, 360
S.W.2d 382 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
17. The cases are clear that continuance of a second action is permitted if
both actions involve the same parties, Brink v. Kansas City, 350 Mo. 845, 217
S.W.2d 507 (Mo. En Banc 1949); State ex rel. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Terte, 351 Mo.
1089, 176 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. En Banc 1943), and Rule 55.31(8) of the MissouRI
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE expressly provides for abatement in these circumstances.
But, since the employer may bring the action in his own name, McKenzie v.
Missouri Stables, Inc., 225 Mo. App. 64, 34 S.W.2d 136 (St. L. Ct. App. 1931),
the parties in the two suits are not technically the same. However, since the
recovering party is deemed the trustee of an express trust for the benefit of the
non-recovering party, Zasslow v. Service Blue Print Co., 288 S.W.2d 377 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1956); Jenkins v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 18 F.R.D. 267 (W. D. Mo.
1955), it could be said that relief should be granted. At minimum it would seem
that the identity of parties is such that a court of equity could grant injunctive
relief against the second suit to avoid duplicity of law suits and double expense for
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TORTS-NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT-PRIVITY:
HAVE. THE EXCEPTIONS FINALLY SWALLOWED THE RULE?
Westerkold v. Carroll'
The defendant in the noted case entered into a contract with the Archdiocese
of St. Louis of the Catholic Church whereby, in addition to his other duties as
architect, he agreed to supervise and inspect the performance of the contractor
which was constructing a church for the Archdiocese. Payments by the owner to
the contractor were required to be made upon certification by the defendant that
work claimed to have been performed and materials furnished and delivered had,
in fact, been performed and delivered, and that the amounts of such payments
correctly reflected the percentage of the work actually then performed and the
percentage of the materials then supplied. 2 In the course of his duties, the de-
fendant certified that more work had been done and more materials' delivered than
was actually the case. Consequently, when the contractor defaulted on the con-
struction contract and the surety was called in to complete the building, there were
insufficient funds remaining under the contract to compensate the surety for the
work remaining and it incurred losses in excess of $93,234. The surety made
demand for payment of these losses upon plaintiff pursuant to an indemnification
agreement entered into previously as an inducement to the surety to execute a
performance bond and a labor and material bond which the construction contract
had called for.4 The plaintiff was forced to pay the surety $17,500 in full settle-
ment of his liability and incurred other expenses in the amount of $2,250.
Subsequently, plaintiff brought suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St.
Louis alleging that his losses as indemnitor were directly and proximately caused
by the carelessness, negligence, and wrongful acts of the defendant in that defendant
wrongfully and negligently failed to inspect and supervise the work performed and
the materials furnished and delivered, and negligently certified more work done
and materials furnished than actually were, which resulted in a substantial over-
payment to the contractor and left insufficient funds for the amount of work and
materials required to complete the building. Plaintiff alleged that defendant knew
or should have known, by the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care, that the
amounts certified were in excess of the services rendered and therefore, he acted
carelessly and negligently in the performance of his duties as architect.5
However, the trial court sustained a motion to dismiss plaintiff's petition on
the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be grantedo
In reversing and remanding the case, the Missouri Supreme Court did not
construe the construction contract,7 but confined itself to the issue of whether
1. 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967).
2. Id. at 74.
3. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Mo. 1967).
4. Id. at 74.
5. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Mo. 1967).
6. Id. at 74.
7. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Mo. 1967).
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in the absence of privity of contract the facts in the case imposed on the defendant
a legal duty to the surety to exercise ordinary care in executing the certificates.8
For the purpose of discussion, the court assumed that the plaintiff was subrogated
to the claims of the surety and could maintain any action against the architect
which the surety could have maintained 9
The requirement of privity has had a long and somewhat odious history in
the field of torts. Stemming from the old English case of Winterbottom v.
Wright,'° the idea that one could not recover in tort for damages arising out of
the negligent performance of a contract unless he was a party or a privy to it was
used to prevent recovery in cases where recovery would have been allowed had
there been no contract. The Winterbottom rule was not broken until MacPherson
v. Bsick Motor Co.,11 wherein the court said that a manufacturer of chattels had
a responsibility to the ultimate consumer which rested, not upon the contract, but
upon the. relationship arising from the purchase and the foreseeability of harm if
proper care in the manufacture were not used.
However, where the negligent performance of a contract results in injury to
an intangible economic interest, courts have been reluctant to depart from the
requiremept of privity.12 The reason seems to have been a deep and abiding fear
of the .prospect of possible unlimited liability to an indeterminate group of people,13
and a noticeable inclination to allow recovery more readily where the damages are
visible and apparent, as in personal injury or serious property damages cases. 14
In addition, there is the idea that to allow a third party to recover would be to
burden the contracting parties with an obligation which they did not voluntarily
assume and deprive them of control over their own contract.15
The court in Westerkold said it would not be bound by the rule of privity
where the reasons for it were not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the
case.10 Although "any extension of the limits and liability in this field should be
8. Id. at 76.
9. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Mo. 1967).
10. 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). For a Missouri case which
adopted the Winterbottom reasoning, see Roddy v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 104
Mo. 234, 15 S.W. 1112, 12 L.R.A. 746 (1891).
11. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). For a list of cases indicating the
application of MacPherson in Missouri, see Lesser v. William Holliday Cord As-
sociates, Inc., 349 F.2d 490, 492 (8th Cir. 1965).
12. See Anderson v. The Boone County Abstract Company, 418 S.W.2d 123
Mo. 1967) and Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441193i). .
13. Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, supra note 12, at 179, 174 N.E. at
444. This was one of the principal reasons put forth for the privity doctrine in
Winterbottom.
14. PRossER, ToRTs 688-89 (3rd ed. 1964). See also Note, 46 CAL. L. REv.
851, 852 (1958).
15. Roddy v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 104 Mo. 234, 15 S.W. 1112, 12 L.R.A.
746 (1891) and Marvin Safe Co. v. Ward, 46 N.J.L. 19 (1884).
16. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 79 (Mo. 1967). The court" relied
heavily on two New York cases, Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275(1922) and Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931),
in ruling that privity was not applicable. In Glanzer, a third party was allowed
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done on a case-to-case basis, with a careful definition of the limits of liability,
depending upon the differing conditions and circumstances to be found in individual
cases," 17 the court felt that the sufficiency of the plaintiff's petition should be
determined by the application of ordinary rules of negligence.' 8Noting as 'a general principle that an obligation may be assumed by 'contract
out of which may arise a duty to third parties, 19 the court felt that the existence
of such a duty here should be determined by foreseeability. In other words, could
the defendant reasonably anticipate that harm or injury to the surety would be
the likely result of his negligent acts? Implicit in this is a recognition by the court
that injury -to an intangible economic interest can be just as harmful as injury
to person or property.
The court found that the defendant could easily foresee the possibility of
harm to the surety by his negligent certification. 20 Also, it disposed 'of defendant's
claim that his negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss21 by
pointing out that the contractor's default was not an intervening cause but merely
the incident the contract provisions had been drawn to guard against.
to recover for harm negligently inflicted upon an intangible economic interest. The
defendant, a' public weigher, negligently overstated the weight of some beans on
a certificate given to the seller which the plaintiff relied on in purchasing them.
The court in an opinion written by Judge Cardozo fixed liability on the defendant
in spite of lack of privity because of a duty imposed by law, given the contract
and the relationship of the parties. The very "end and aim" of the weighing was
to shape the conduct of the plaintiff. Defendant's knowledge of this imposed a
duty upon him to weigh carefully for the benefit of all who were relying upon
him. In Ultramares, the same judge denied recovery in a. suit by a third party who
had relied on a certified balance sheet prepared by the defendants in making a
loan to a corporation which was actually insolvent. The corporation had asked the
defendants to make an audit which they did in a negligent fashion, causing the
certified balance sheet to be erroneous. Judge Cardozo felt that privity should not
be dispensed with here because the plaintiff's connection with the transaction was
not close enough to give rise to a duty on the defendant's part. The service was
performed primarily for the benefit of the client and not for unknown investors.
Cardozo was afraid that to allow recovery here would be to expose accountants
"to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an in-
determinate class."
The Missouri court noted that the prospect of unlimited liability was not
present here since the amount of damages could never exceed the value of the
difference between the work actually done and that certified, and liability could
not extend to anyone not in actual privity other than the surety and his subrogees.
Also, the person not in privity who would be injured by defendant's negligence
was known, and the "end and aim" of the contract for certification was for the
benefit of the surety as much as for the owner. In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied on language in Hall v. Union Indemnity Co., 61 F.2d 85, 88 (8th Cir.
1932).
17. Westerhold v. Carroll, supra note 16, at 77-78.
18. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 80 (Mo. 1967).
19. Ibid. See also PRossER, ToRTs 658 (3rd ed. 1964).
20. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 80 (Mo. 1967). The court noted
with approval another case in which the same result was reached. See State of
Mississippi, for the use of National Surety Corporation v. Malvaney, 221 Miss. 190,
72 So.2d 424, 43 A.L.R.2d 1212 (1954).
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The consequences of the Westerkold decision could be far.reaching. Logically,
there is no reason why the language in this case could not be applied to anyone
who in the course of his business or profession supplies information to or for the
benefit of third parties where it is foreseeable that his negligence would result in
injury to their .economic interest. 22 Also, even though the court made a specific
finding of reliance in this case,23 one wonders if this element would be necessary
in every case. Quoting a California case,2 4 the court listed the following as factors
to be balanced and considered in determining whether a person should be held
liable to a third party not in privity:
1. The extent to which the transaction was intefnded to affect the
plaintiff.
2. The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.
3. The degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury.
4. The closeness of the connection between the defefidant's conduct
and the injury suffered.
5. The moral blame attached to the" defendant's conduct.
6. The policy of preventing future harm.25
Reliance on the part of the plaintiff is not listed and in fact was not present in
Biakania, where these factors were first listed 2 6 Conceivably, a Missouri court
could find for the plaintiff in the absence of reliance, if one or more of the above
elements were satisfied.
Finally, the question arises as to whether this latest exception really swallows
the rule of privity. Although the Missouri court talked in terms of another excep-
tion and only considered the plaintiff's petition in terms of negligence after it
was satisfied that the usual reasons for imposing the privity requirements were not
present, is there anything left for the privity rule to operate on? It would seem
that all suits by a third party for the negligent performance of a contract could
be analyzed and decided in negligence terms, using the various factors set forth
above by the court, without resort to the artificial contract term, privity.
22. See M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary District, 198 Cal.
App.2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961) where an engineering company was held liable
to a bidder on a sewer project who had relied on a soil report which the defendant
had negligently prepared for the sanitary district; and Hedley Byrne & Co. v.
Heller & Partners [1964], A.C. 465 where liability for negligence was extended to
pecuniary loss in any case where some "special relation" between the parties could
be found. See also Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV.
231 (1966).
23. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 79 (Mo. 1967). Note that the
RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 552 (1938) lists reliance as one of the elements necessary
for recovery for negligent misrepresentation.
24. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 (1958).
25. Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 81 (Mo. 1967).
26. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358 (1958).
In Biakanja, the defendant, a notary public, was held liable for negligently failing
to have a will properly witnessed. As a result, the plaintiff, who was the sole
beneficiary under the will, received only 's of the decedent's estate through
intestate succession. See Note, 46 CAL. L. REv. 851 (1958).
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The law of torts has made great strides since the days of Winterbottom v.
Wright, and it is now possible to limit the spectre of unlimited liability through
application of the concept of duty or proximate cause. In addition, the idea that
to allow a third party to recover would be to burden the contracting parties with
an obligation which they did not voluntarily assume is not true, once it is found
that the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant is such that the
defendant owes a duty to use due care in performing his contract. If the factors
set forth in Westerkold are present, the defendant has voluntarily assumed an
obligation imposed by law. This does not mean that he must perform his con-
tract exactly as agreed in order to avoid liability to a third party, but only that
he must use due care.
The language of Westerkold v. Carroll leads one to believe that in the future
Missouri courts will justify any decision withholding liability to a third party for
negligence in performing a contract on tort grounds rather than lack of privity.
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